

Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenals: A Threat to U.S. Security

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Abstract

Analyzing social, political, and economic sectors within Pakistan, this paper details the various fundamental mechanisms impacting Pakistan's nuclear program. The origins and capabilities of Pakistan's nuclear arsenals are highlighted throughout with an emphasis on the role of history and religion. The paper identifies how key elements in Pakistan interconnect and create instability and vulnerability within Pakistan's nuclear program. This paper will present the five most alarming threats Pakistan's arsenal have on U.S. security, and provides policy recommendations that are instrumental in increasing U.S. interests. The monetary relationship between both countries is explored and is recognized as a tool that can be used by the United States (U.S.) to increase the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenals. An interdependence that bonds U.S. funding to Pakistan with security mandates will increase the security capabilities of Pakistan's arsenals and insure that U.S. threats are diminished. With a mutual cooperation both countries can effectively pursue their interests; Pakistan can expand nuclear arsenals and the U.S. can assure that security measures are taken to protect national interests.

Key Words: Pakistan, India, Religion, Nuclear Arms Race, Nuclear Arsenals, Proliferation, Terrorism, Monetary Aid, and National Security

History of Pakistan and Indian Relations

The origins and progress of Pakistan's nuclear program is consistent with the country's relations with India. Geographically larger and economically more powerful than its neighboring country, India is increasingly looked upon as a threat to Pakistan.¹ Tensions between Pakistan and India have resulted in three major wars since 1947; defeated on some level in each war, Pakistan's vulnerability has led it to seek methods to secure its position.² The year 1971 would specifically trigger this interest, when India's armed forces equipped and financed Bangladesh forces and successfully established independence for the eastern portion of Pakistan.³ The results of this war would increase tensions and prove that India had the capabilities to pursue their

¹ Tkacik, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security," 176.

² Tkacik, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security," 176.

³ Tkacik, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security," 176.

interests with no considerable threat of retaliation.⁴ Immediately following these events, Pakistan fully engaged in the development of nuclear weapons and made it the most important national goal.⁵ Today, Pakistan has successfully become proficient in asymmetrical warfare by developing nuclear weapons and using terrorism as a means of protection.

Significant events have proven that Pakistan's nuclear program is efficient in protecting Pakistan from India. In 1986, India began training exercises close to Pakistan's border in Rajasthan.⁶ The event, known as the Brasstacks crisis, consisted of various exercises that included India's armed forces and tactical nuclear weaponry. Considered a threat to security, Pakistan quickly began military and nuclear exercises in Punjab.⁷ Both events caused an increase in tension but ultimately ended. Thought to have not progressed because of Pakistan's nuclear potential, India's exercises were halted, proving that Pakistan's nuclear program was a threat to India.

Following this crisis, many events have occurred in which Pakistan has used threats of nuclear weapons against India. One of the most significant events was the 2001-2002 Border Confrontation Crisis. The crisis began with an attack on the Indian parliament by Jais-e-Monhammes and Laskar-e-Taiba two terrorist organizations that are supported by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, its premier intelligence agency more commonly known by its initials ISI, and would result in the deployment of 500,000 Indian troops to the Pakistan border.⁸ Quickly retaliating, the Pakistan military deployed forces, causing a threat of war in South East Asia. As in previous crises, the nuclear threat was consistently signaled throughout both countries and resulted in U.S. mediation.⁹ Although the U.S successfully decreased tensions between the two countries, the underlying realities of both countries nuclear capabilities are what kept the countries from taking drastic actions.

Religious Aspects

A major actor that raises Pakistan's ant-India sentiments is religion. Islam, the state religion of Pakistan, has helped the country create a national identity that unites the civilian population while gaining external support from other Islamic countries.¹⁰ One event that

⁴ Tkacik, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security," 176.

⁵ Tkacik, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security," 176.

⁶ Tkacik, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security," 177.

⁷ Tkacik, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security," 177.

⁸ Tkacik, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security," 179.

⁹ Tkacik, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security," 180.

¹⁰ Tkacik, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security," 176..

strengthened Islamic sediment was the U.S. encouragement to unite Muslims against the Soviets in 1979.¹¹ This legacy of unification through religion has extended well into the 21st century; in specific, it has continued the deep tensions between Islamic Pakistan and Hindu India. One example of this legacy is Pakistan's use of 'jihad' as a means of waging war against India in Kashmir.¹² India [beginning in the 1990's] would also use religion to mobilize the masses against a common enemy.¹³ For purposes of this paper, the religious context of India and Pakistan is important because of the significant role it plays in the tensions between the two countries, tensions that deepen an already weak Pakistan-Indian relation and result in a progressive nuclear program on both sides.

Pakistan's Nuclear Program

U.S. policy against the rise of China has led to a strong relationship with India. This relationship has increased fear in Pakistan and has led to a rapid progression of its nuclear program. Today, Pakistan is estimated to possess over 100 nuclear weapons and is developing various ballistic missiles that range from short to medium to even long-range capabilities.¹⁴ In addition, Pakistan is suspected to have a stockpile of 2750 kg of weapon grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) and is producing 150 kg of HEU a year.¹⁵ Needing only 15-20 kg of HEU to produce an HEU based nuclear weapon; these stockpiles represent the true nuclear potential of Pakistan.¹⁶ Michael Tkacik, a political science professor, stated that, "Pakistan has enough weapon-grade material for between 100-158 weapons, with a narrower estimate of 123-129 warheads."¹⁷

Pakistan has also begun to develop plutonium-based nuclear weapons. Pursuing an increase in their nuclear arsenal, Pakistan has increased their plutonium extraction capabilities.¹⁸ Production of plutonium is estimated to total 140 kg and has shifted production from HEU weapons to lighter more compact plutonium based weapons.¹⁹ Even though, the Pakistan Foreign Minister stated in 2011 that, "Pakistan is mindful of the need to avoid an arms race with India," it is without a doubt that an arms race has already begun.²⁰

¹¹ Tkacik, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security," 176.

¹² The term jihad actually refers to the more general concept of exerting efforts in the way of Allah, of which fighting the enemy, or armed jihad, is only one aspect. "The Meaning of Jihad"

¹³ Tkacik, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security," 176.

¹⁴ Acheson, "Assuring Destruction Forever"

¹⁵ HEU is highly enrich uranium, Acheson, "Assuring Destruction Forever"

¹⁶ Tkacik, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security," 182.

¹⁷ Tkacik, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security," 183.

¹⁸ Tkacik, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security," 182.

¹⁹ Acheson, "Assuring Destruction Forever"

²⁰ Kerr and Nikitn, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues," 12.

Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine

Although there is no precise strategic nuclear doctrine, Pakistan has unofficially stated a guiding principle for its nuclear actions. A strategic principle established on deterrence, Pakistan has two policies that guide its nuclear objectives: the first policy specifies that the country will deter external aggression with conventional and strategic forces; secondly, the country will deter counterforce by securing assets and using nuclear threats.²¹ Pakistan has also claimed that it will not use its nuclear capabilities as a first strike on non-nuclear-weapon states, but it has had no objection to first strikes on states with nuclear arms.²² This unofficial strategic doctrine has indicated that Pakistan hopes to secure its territorial integrity against Indian attacks with the use of nuclear threats.²³ Even though this unofficial doctrine has laid out Pakistan's objectives, its informal nature establishes a vulnerability that can cause the country to engage in impulsive decisions against any menacing event.

Command and Control

Pakistan's command and control system has increased the security of nuclear weapons by dividing power amongst many of their government organization. Pakistan's command organization is made up of a three-tiered system that consists of the National Command Authority (NCA), The Strategic Plans Division (SPD), and the Strategic Forces Commands.²⁴ Established in the year 2000, the NCA was created to supervise the functions of all of Pakistan's nuclear weapon development, research, employees, and military operations concerning nuclear weapons.²⁵ The NCA staff consists of the Prime Minister (Chairperson), Joint Chief of Staff, Minister of Defense, Minister of the Interior, Minister of Finance, the Director General of the SPD and the Commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air force²⁶. Final authority of any nuclear launches requires NCA approval, but is ultimately decided by the vote of the Prime Minister.²⁷ The NCA is further subdivided into two entities: the Employment Committee (ECC) and the Development Control Committee (ECC). These committees, primarily made up of civilian and military personnel, are in charge of establishing the guidelines for nuclear use and the financial and administrative control over nuclear laboratories, research, and developmental organizations.²⁸

Proliferation and A.Q Khan Network

Most of the nuclear security measures Pakistan had adopted in recent years are a direct result of the A.Q. Khan network, a proliferation network that began in the 1970's when Pakistan pursued

²¹ Kerr and Nikitn, *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues*,” 12.

²² Kerr and Nikitn, *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues*,” 12.

²³ Kerr and Nikitn, *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues*,” 12.

²⁴ Kerr and Nikitn, *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues*,” 12.

²⁵ Kerr and Nikitn, *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues*,” 12.

²⁶ Kerr and Nikitn, *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues*,” 13.

²⁷ Kerr and Nikitn, *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues*,” 12.

²⁸ Kerr and Nikitn, *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues*,” 13.

the development of a nuclear bomb.²⁹ Using clandestine networks to gather the technology and equipment needed for nuclear development, Pakistan began an import and export system of nuclear material.³⁰ Named after Dr. A.Q. Khan, a Pakistan nuclear scientist, the A.Q. Khan network is said to have supplied (for profit) uranium enrichment materials and design to North Korea, Iran, and Libya.³¹ One statement made by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence declared that, “Pakistan has been a major source of nuclear proliferation until the disruption of the A.Q Khan network.”³² Although Pakistan has claimed to have no involvement in the proliferation network, analysts have declared that the network could not have existed without government involvement.³³ Today, there are uncertainties about the A.Q. Khan network’s livelihood and the potential associates that are involved in a nuclear black-market.³⁴

Terrorism and Nuclear Technology

After the U.S supported the mobilization of Islamic radicals in 1979, Pakistan continued its ties with Islamic organizations. Quickly after the Soviet’s eviction from Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan began to support the creation of the Taliban to pursue its own interests in Afghanistan.³⁵ In the same manner, Pakistan has supported terrorist acts against India in the Kashmir region.³⁶ Although Pakistan has cooperated with the United States against terrorism, it has proven to be an untrustworthy ally. Consistently pursuing their own interests, Pakistan continues to support terrorist organizations.³⁷ Since 2005, Pakistan border regions were surrendered to Taliban militants, Salafi jihadist, and Deobandi influenced groups; this has consequentially created a weak border that permits terrorist mobility.³⁸ An example of this mobility occurred in the 2001, as the U.S. invaded Afghanistan, leaders and supporters of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda fled to Pakistan’s border, proving the weakness and support of the state.³⁹

²⁹ Kerr and Nikitn, *Pakistans Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues*,” 20.

³⁰ Kerr and Nikitn, *Pakistans Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues*,” 21.

³¹ Dr Khan is known as the founder the Pakistan Uranium enrichment program

³² John D. Negroponte Unclassified statement for the Record Annual Threat Assessment, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January, 11, 2007. Kerr and Nikitn, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” 21.

³³ Tkacik, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security,” 192.

³⁴ Although many of the associates involved have faced investigation many have gone unsuspected. Suspiciously, Pakistan has never allowed the U.S to interrogate Dr. Khan. Kerr and Nikitn, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” 20.

³⁵ Tkacik, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security,” 181.

³⁶ Tkacik, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security,” 181.

³⁷ Tkacik, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security,” 181. Acts of terrorism are specifically made in the Kashmir region

³⁸ Tkacik, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security,” 181.

³⁹ Gul, “Afghanistan Imbroglio: Implications for Pakistan's Tribal Areas.”

In addition, Pakistan's ISI is a known enabler of terrorist organizations under the International Islamic Front. Known for their anti-American sentiments, the International Islamic Front, made up of terrorist organizations such as Harkut-ul Mujahideen (HUM), Lashkar-eToiba (LET), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), al-Qaeda, and others, are frequently supported by Pakistan's ISI and military.⁴⁰ This relationship between the ISI and terrorist organizations complicates Pakistan's alliance with the U.S. pursuing their own interest, specifically in Indian matters, the ISI looks to terrorism as a tool that benefits them against their powerful neighbor. One source stated, "The problem with Pakistan is that they still differentiate between 'good' terrorists and 'bad' terrorists."⁴¹ Even though the ISI has provided the U.S with jihadist information, they continue to support terrorist organizations and are an ally of the U.S only when it is beneficial to their cause.

Concerning nuclear weapons, the linkage between Pakistan and terrorist groups is a threat to the U.S. After the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001, information surfaced through the media that claimed that there had been communications between Pakistani nuclear scientists and al-Qaeda.⁴² Reportedly, six scientists met with Osama Bin Laden in Kabul in August of 2001 and discussed the materials needed to develop nuclear weapons.⁴³ Most notably, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, who is a founder of the Pakistani nuclear program and held a senior position at the Atomic Energy Commission in Pakistan, was one of the six who met with Bin Laden.⁴⁴ Known to possess extreme Islamic views, Mahmood was interrogated by U.S officials and admitted to discussing nuclear technology with Bin Laden, but did not admit to passing any nuclear secrets.⁴⁵ After failing numerous U.S. lie detector tests, Mahmood was not charged with any criminal charges by the Pakistani government, proving Pakistan was an untrustworthy ally of the U.S.⁴⁶ Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, nonproliferation specialists, stated that, "The willingness of Pakistani scientists to work with Bin Laden leaves open the possibility that, with or without official sanction, Pakistan nuclear technology is likely to be leaked to resourceful Islamic radicals."⁴⁷ This event would establish the potential of an "insider threat" within the Pakistani nuclear program.⁴⁸

Five U.S Security Threats

The United States today faces five security challenges in Pakistan. Creating a strategic plan, or various plans, can ensure U.S. security if it becomes vulnerable to any of the five security threats. First, the U.S. must acknowledge that there is a current nuclear arms race between Pakistan and India; secondly, the threat of nuclear proliferation; thirdly, Pakistan's

⁴⁰ Atal, "Extremist, Nuclear Pakistan An Emerging Threat?," 4.

⁴¹ Goldberg and Ambinder, "The Ally From Hell" 6.

⁴² Atal, "Extremist, Nuclear Pakistan An Emerging Threat?," 4.

⁴³ Kerr and Nikitn, *Pakistans Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues*, 22.

⁴⁴ Kerr and Nikitn, *Pakistans Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues*, 23.

⁴⁵ Atal, "Extremist, Nuclear Pakistan An Emerging Threat?," 5.

⁴⁶ Atal, "Extremist, Nuclear Pakistan An Emerging Threat?," 5.

⁴⁷ Atal, "Extremist, Nuclear Pakistan An Emerging Threat?," 5.

⁴⁸ Kerr and Nikitn, *Pakistans Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues*, 23.

inadequate nuclear arsenals; fourthly, the Islamist influence in Pakistan; and lastly, the potential of a state failure.

The Nuclear Arms Race

As Pakistan and India strive to pursue their advantages, nuclear development becomes a decisive factor in both countries' strategic plan. Pakistan's increased plutonium production, HEU supply, and missile developments establish Pakistan's incentives of increasing the country's nuclear capabilities.⁴⁹ Most importantly, Pakistan's production of the Shaheen-2 missile, which can put most of India at risk in the event of a launch, has increased.⁵⁰ Although the increase in nuclear production has the potential to start a war, history has not proven this to be necessarily true. In contrast, the nuclear arm's race between the two countries works as a deterrent keeping both countries from engaging in war.

Since war is an unlikely event, the U.S. must look at the other consequences the arms race is producing. One consequence of the arms race is the social implications it has on Pakistan's civil society. Diverting funding from economic and social development, nuclear production is stripping monetary funds that can be used for the improvement of infrastructure, health care, and education.⁵¹ This underfunding decreases the living standards among Pakistan's population. This decrease in living standards can increase chaos amongst civilians, causing revolutions that can potentially place terrorists in government control. This implies that Pakistan's nuclear arsenals, through civilian revolt, can become assets of anti-U.S. terrorist organizations.

The United States can play a critical role in increasing the living standard of the Pakistani people and consequentially decrease the possibilities of revolution. Currently, the 2010 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (EPPA), which will continue funding until 2014, gives \$1.5 billion annually of nonmilitary aid to Pakistan.⁵² This monetary aid is allocated for the promotion of social and economic development and requires Pakistan to submit an Assistance Strategy Report that outlines the projects the aid will go towards before receiving funds.⁵³ In theory, EPPA is a strategic tool for the United States, but it can be improved. If the United States would create a U.S committee in charge of analyzing and creating a Pakistan Strategy Report, it would ensure that the Pakistan government is not allocating funds in unnecessary sectors.

⁴⁹ Tkacik, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security," 191.

⁵⁰ Tkacik, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security," 191.

⁵¹ Tkacik, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security," 191.

⁵² Epstein and Kronstadt, "Pakistan: U.S Foreign Assistance," 8.

⁵³ Epstein and Kronstadt, "Pakistan: U.S Foreign Assistance," 8.

Proliferation

The threat of Pakistan's proliferation traces back to the events of the A.Q. Khan network; today, the legacies of proliferation continue to be a threat to U.S. security. The U.S. strategy of non-proliferation has made countries, such as Pakistan, pursue proliferation as a means of gaining nuclear technology.⁵⁴ If the United States were to adopt a strategic position, in which it provides technology to Pakistan's nuclear program, it would become aware of Pakistan's nuclear capabilities. Michael Tkacik claims that the effects of U.S. refusal to provide Pakistan with nuclear technology, "has forced Pakistan to trade with an assist the nuclear programs of state such as North Korea and Iran."⁵⁵ Adopting a "nuclear technology partnership" would give the U.S. two advantages: it would give the U.S. a strategic position of knowing the locations of nuclear arsenals and their developmental progress, it would also reduce the risk of other countries, mainly U.S. enemies, from gaining technology through Pakistan proliferation.

Inadequate Security

Pakistan's rapid increase in nuclear weapons has not been consistent with the country's security capabilities. Repeatedly, Pakistan has stated that their nuclear weapons are secured from external infiltration and unauthorized use. One security measure that has been taken by the Pakistan government is the creation of a two-stage storage facility, which stores warheads (containing fissile cores) separate from delivery vehicles.⁵⁶ Although this measure decreases the potential of an unauthorized launch it does not overcome the possibilities of external attainability. Nonproliferation specialists state that, "it may be easier for unauthorized people to remove a weapons fissile material core if it is not assembled."⁵⁷ Additionally, the two-stage storage facility becomes vulnerable to an organized attack in the case of a crisis. In the event that Pakistan needed to assemble a nuclear weapon, it would have to transport the fissile cores to the delivery vehicles, inevitably increasing vulnerability of a mobile attack.⁵⁸

Current attacks on Pakistan's government agencies prove their security systems to be outdated and unreliable. In 2009, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi staged an attack on the General Headquarter (GHQ) of the Pakistan army located in Rawalpindi.⁵⁹ Known as one of the most secure military complexes in Pakistan, the GHQ was infiltrated by 10 terrorists who took more than 40 people hostage.⁶⁰ This event would prove the inadequate levels of security within Pakistan. Most importantly, it would give rise to suspicious activity within Pakistan's military. The GHQ attack was successful because of the high levels of information the terrorists obtained.⁶¹ Uniforms, ID cards, and detailed maps were all tools used

⁵⁴ Tkacik, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security," 192.

⁵⁵ Tkacik, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security," 192.

⁵⁶ Kerr and Nikitn, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues," 14.

⁵⁷ Kerr and Nikitn, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues," 14.

⁵⁸ Kerr and Nikitn, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues," 14.

⁵⁹ Gregory, "Terrorist Tactics in Pakistan Threaten Nuclear Weapons Safety," 6.

⁶⁰ Gregory, "Terrorist Tactics in Pakistan Threaten Nuclear Weapons Safety," 6.

⁶¹ Gregory, "Terrorist Tactics in Pakistan Threaten Nuclear Weapons Safety," 6.

in the attack. This would prove that the terrorists had to have had an insider working on their behalf.⁶² The article, “Terrorist Tactics in Pakistan Threaten Nuclear Weapons Safety,” by Shaun Gregory claimed that, “As the number of nuclear weapons facilities grows, and the number of those with access to nuclear weapons or related components rises, the complex challenge of assuring the security of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon components will become ever more difficult. Terrorist groups have shown themselves to be capable of penetrating even the most securely defended Pakistan military base.”⁶³

Today, the United States aids the security development of Pakistan through the EPPA. The EPPA security funds allocates “as many funds as are needed” for security assistance.⁶⁴ Security assistance and arms transfers are prohibited by the act, unless the government of Pakistan continues to cooperate with U.S. efforts against terrorist groups and proliferation networks.⁶⁵ Although aid under EPPA has proven to be efficient in developing security in Pakistan, the U.S must take further steps to ensure the maximum utilization of funds. The U.S can push the Pakistan government to develop higher staff security by requiring them to create a strategic plan for the allocation of funds. Resembling the EPPA social and economic development funding, the security sector of the EPPA can also require a yearly strategy report outlining the weaknesses and strengths of Pakistan’s physical and technical security.

Islamist Influence in Pakistan and the Potential of State Failure

The influence of Islamist sentiment within the key sectors of Pakistan society increases the vulnerabilities of the nuclear arsenals. Discussed above are the relationships amongst Pakistan’s ISI, military, and terrorist organizations. Undeniably, if Pakistan were to experience a period of social instability, these keys sectors would likely support terrorist initiatives to pursue radical Islamist goals.⁶⁶

The U.S. must have a strategic plan in the event of a radical Islamic coup.⁶⁷ In 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated, “We have noted this problem, and we are prepared to try to deal with it.”⁶⁸ Currently, the United States Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) has been preparing for such an event.⁶⁹ Trained to find, secure, and evacuate nuclear weapons, the JSOC has begun underground shelter penetration that uses radiological detection devices to pick up traces of nuclear material. These devices will help the JSOC locate fissile material underground, a beneficial tool for the U.S., who has limited knowledge on the location of nuclear arsenals within Pakistan.⁷⁰ The Global Security News, in the article “The Pentagon’s Secret

⁶² Gregory, “Terrorist Tactics in Pakistan Threaten Nuclear Weapons Safety,” 6.

⁶³ Gregory, “Terrorist Tactics in Pakistan Threaten Nuclear Weapons Safety,” 7.

⁶⁴ Epstein and Kronstadt, “Pakistan: U.S Foreign Assistance,” 9.

⁶⁵ Epstein and Kronstadt, “Pakistan: U.S Foreign Assistance,” 9.

⁶⁶ Tkacik, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons program and Implications for US National Security,” 197.

⁶⁷ Kerr and Nikitn, “Pakistans Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” 18.

⁶⁸ Kerr and Nikitn, “Pakistans Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” 18.

⁶⁹ Goldberg and Ambinder, “The Pentagon's Secret Plans to Secure Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal”

⁷⁰ Goldberg and Ambinder, “The Pentagon's Secret Plans to Secure Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal”

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Plans to Secure Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal, claimed that, the U.S military and intelligence forces are positioned and equipped in the region to go into the country in the case of coup.⁷¹ The U.S must continue these efforts in pursuing strategic plans that can ensure the security of nuclear arsenals in the event of a radical Islamist coup.

Conclusion

The complex relations in Pakistan make U.S security procedures difficult to pursue. Undeniably, Pakistan's efforts to progress their nuclear capabilities will continue. The U.S must consider a strategy that does not prevent progress from occurring, but ensures security if nuclear elements are acquired by terrorist organizations. Approaching the five threats independently will establish a strategic plan that will target the vulnerabilities within Pakistan. Constructing a monetary aid strategy that creates mandates for Pakistan is a strategy that can bring the U.S. one step closer to its security goals in Pakistan's nuclear arsenals. Using a policy that resembles the EPPA's social and economic development funding, security funding can be disbursed, monitored and controlled by the U.S. to maximize the mutual benefits of the intended programs under the U.S. Monetary aid; thus, crafting a tool for the U.S in building a bond that expands both countries interests. By becoming allies in the expansion of Pakistan's nuclear program the U.S will insure their own security interests and diminish threats to the international community.

⁷¹ Goldberg and Ambinder, "The Pentagon's Secret Plans to Secure Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal"

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