Rediscovering Japanese Homeland Security: From Prohibition to Best-Practices since America's Post-World War II Occupation of Japan

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Abstract

Many experts have focused on Japan's system of homeland security, especially since 9/11, arguing both that Japan's focused and centralized system provides a model for America, and that Japan could do more to assist the United States in the global fight against terrorism. These arguments, however, ignore the fact that the tempest of America's Occupation of Japan shaped Japan's model for homeland security. Douglas MacArthur, the architect of most occupation policy, wanted Japan's security guaranteed only by an agreement between the United States and Russia, leaving Japan with virtually no system of self-defense. Only the efforts of General Robert Eichelberger and the American Council for Japan allowed Japan an armed constabulary, which grew to an armed National Defense Force.

Key words: American Occupation of Japan, Robert L. Eichelberger, Japanese Homeland Security, Japanese policing, American Council for Japan

Introduction

Since 9/11, there has been increased interest in homeland security, not only in the United States, but also in countries throughout the world. As the U.S. has expanded operations into Iraq and Afghanistan, there has been increasing awareness that the U.S. cannot fight Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations alone, but must enlist the support of other allies in Africa, the Middle East and the Far East. One of those countries that have gained increased attention is Japan. Some have argued that Japan has the ability to do more in the global struggle against terrorism, partly because the U.S. has partially funded Japanese defense efforts for the last 60 years. Others have argued that Japan offers a unique model for the United States, since Japan has a streamlined model of homeland security that has worked well over the past several decades. Edward Olson, for example, in an article from the Independent Institute entitled "Learning from Japan," argues that the U.S. has much to learn from Japan on the issue of homeland security. In particular, Olson argues that Japan has an efficient and effective model of homeland security that focuses on limited goals such as the self-defense of the Japanese mainland, and which avoids the complex and overlapping goals of the various American agencies that share responsibility for the war on terrorism. (Olson 2004, 1-4)
Regardless of the efficiency of the Japanese model, Olson recognizes that many of the virtues of the Japanese model are a direct result of the historical development of the Japanese political system stemming from the post-World War II period. Indeed, evidence indicates that the very existence of any form of Japanese "homeland security" almost failed. The purpose of this paper is to document the fight for the very existence of Japanese homeland security, which was opposed by many (if not most) Americans in the period immediately after World War II (and during the American occupation of Japan). If, as Olson writes, Japanese security has much to offer as a model for American homeland security, that system was created under the guidance of American officials which struggled with the very question of whether Japan should be allowed any form of self-protection. A limited form of Japanese homeland security eventually emerged, but that result very nearly did not happen, since powerful forces within the American occupation wished to leave Japan with virtually no ability to defend itself.

**Conditions in Post-War Japan**

When World War II ended in 1945, the nation of Japan was in tatters. With her merchant fleet destroyed, cities burned and gutted, and economy in ruins, the vast majority of the Japanese civilians faced starvation. As one American observed noted,

The damage and desolation in Yokohama gave us an accurate picture of what we were to find in all the large cities of Japan . . . In Yokohama some of the largest structures had survived, but we learned that a single firebomb raid in May 1945 had destroyed eighty percent of the city. There was almost nothing for sale in the stores-- little food, little or no consumer goods of any kind. The people were dressed in rags or rough wartime clothing. (Eichelberger 1950, 263)

In Tokyo, conditions were even worse. Another observer wrote:

A great many streets no longer exist. Bulldozers have scraped away the debris and in many cases, great cities of pre-fabricated living quarters and storehouses have been erected. The total population of Tokyo has probably been reduced to one-third. (Eichelberger Papers, Personal Correspondence, 9 March 1946)

Despite the suffering of the Japanese civilians, the Americans were in no mood for sympathy. In 1944, a Gallup Poll revealed that thirteen percent of the American public favored exterminating all Japanese. As Michael Schaller notes in his book *The American Occupation of Japan*, a third of Americans in 1945 favored the execution of Emperor Hirohito. One U.S. Senator urged the U.S. military to "gut the heart of Japan with fire," while another attempted to persuade General MacArthur that all Japanese should be "sterilized." Elliott Roosevelt, the president's son, told his confidantes that the United States should continue "bombing until we have destroyed about half the Japanese civilian population." In addition, even President Franklin Roosevelt floated a plan to "crossbreed" the Japanese with less warlike Pacific nationalities. (Schaller 1985, 3-4)

Amidst these vengeful impulses, a plan emerged to ensure that Japan would never again have the ability to wage war. Based on the Potsdam Declaration, the plan was to completely demilitarize Japan-- disarm and permanently disband the Japanese military, try and execute war
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criminals, identify and eliminate all paramilitary organizations, and rewrite the Japanese Constitution according to democratic principles, including freedom of speech and religion. To accomplish these reforms, American (and some international) military forces would occupy Japan, with Japan permitted to "maintain [only] such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations." (Eichelberger Papers, Administrative Orders and Memorandums, Box 123, 4 September 1945 to 15 November 1945)

According to classified military documents, the "principle purposes of the military occupation of Japan" were as follows . . .

b. To advance the post-war objectives of the United Nations. Among these are:

(1) The abolition of militarism and militant nationalism in Japan.
(2) The encouragement, subject to the need for maintaining military security, of liberal tendencies and processes such as freedom of religion, press, speech and assembly.
(3) The creation of conditions which will insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world and which will permit the eventual emergence of a government which will respect the rights of other nations and Japan's international obligations. (Eichelberger Papers, Administrative Order No. 15, 14 November 1945)

In order to accomplish these aims, other tasks had to be completed. More than six million Japanese soldiers had to be returned to Japan from abroad (mostly from China and Korea), Japanese war criminals arrested and prosecuted, foreign nationals returned to their places of origin, crops harvested and food rationed, the rubble cleared and cities rebuilt, and the Japanese economy restored to a limited degree. Amidst these changes, maintaining law and order was imperative, not only among the Japanese population, but also among the more than 150,000 occupation soldiers, many who retained a deep hatred for the Japanese. Moreover, as if these tasks were not daunting enough, the very question of instituting democratic reforms in Japan was in doubt, especially since the Japanese had no history of democratic principles or an understanding of a Constitution based on individual rights. Finally, while the Japanese quickly demonstrated a willingness to comply with occupation directives, most American authorities in 1945 thought it was impossible to prevent starvation for a portion of the Japanese population. While many of the top generals and occupation authorities hoped for the best, many privately feared that the occupation was doomed to failure from the start. (Eichelberger Papers, Summations of Non-Military Activities, June 1946)

Structure of Occupation

The people who directed occupation policy, however, were more confident in their ability to remake Japan. The State Department, the Far Eastern Commission, the War Department, and General Douglas MacArthur and his staff (especially General Charles A. Willoughby, head of
the Public Safety Division, and General Courtney Whitney, head of the Government Section) created and wrote the directives of the occupation. The State Department technically had the greatest power, but General MacArthur, who had gained enormous prestige due to his victories over the Japanese in World War II, bristled over what he considered interference from the advisors in Washington. MacArthur depended upon his own instincts and the proven talents of his staff, who allegedly wrote most of the new Japanese Constitution in their own offices. While MacArthur wrote policy, he remained in his headquarters in Tokyo, and rarely left the confines of his own office and dwelling. He relied on the commander of the Eighth Army, General Robert L. Eichelberger, as his "eyes and ears;" Eichelberger spent most of the years 1945-48 touring the various parts of Japan, and reporting to MacArthur's office about conditions "on the frontlines." Assisting Eichelberger and the Eighth Army were the newly elected Japanese authorities and Japanese police, who were responsible for most of the tasks of the occupation under the direction of Eighth Army. According to the existing structure, MacArthur and his staff (along with input from Washington) set policy, and then transmitted the policies to the Eighth Army, with the Eighth Army then directing the Japanese authorities to accomplish the objectives. Hence, the Japanese police and government authorities were responsible for maintaining law and order, arresting Japanese war criminals, destroying all Japanese weaponry and munitions, and eliminating the vestiges of paramilitary organizations, with Eighth Army's mission to "watch and report" on Japanese activities and progress. (Eichelberger Papers, Dictations, no date; Eichelberger 1950, 265-71)

The result was that a small circle of people, with MacArthur at the center, devised and controlled the occupation of Japan. With each passing year, MacArthur usurped more powers pertaining to the occupation, until he virtually felt comfortable ignoring the "pleas" and advice of Washington politicians. The Eighth Army, while relegated to a secondary role, in fact were critical players, since they provided the only first-hand feedback on the successes and failures of occupation policy. Robert Eichelberger, since he had most contact with the mayors, provincial leaders and ministers of Japan, became the second most powerful man in the occupation, second only to MacArthur. In fact, when Japanese business leaders or politicians had problems or concerns, it was Eichelberger and not MacArthur that they turned for help. Eichelberger, in turn, found that he had to depend on the Japanese population for information, cooperation and assistance. In particular, the Japanese police played the most pivotal role, for without their help, it was impossible to gather the food harvest, arrest war criminals or enforce occupation policy. Eichelberger quickly recognized the importance of the Japanese police, especially as he saw the Eight Army personnel reduced to a fraction of their numbers and combat effectiveness within 12 months of the end of the fighting in the Pacific. (Chwialkowski 1993, 151-57; Eichelberger Papers, Dictations, 5 December 1960)

The Japanese Police and Events in the Occupation

Several events in the early stages of the occupation convinced Eichelberger that the Japanese police were not only critical players in the occupation, but must be strengthened and supported. First, several violent incidents occurred between U.S. occupation forces and the Japanese occupation, precipitated by American veterans who wanted to "toughen up the occupation" by beating up Japanese civilians who had the misfortune of crossing their path. After this received national publicity, the civilians in the city of Yalata (between Tokyo and
Yokohama) formed a vigilante organization, and vowed to attack any American serviceman who toured the town in their off duty hours, especially those who attempted to "date" or make social contact with Japanese women. This situation resulted in the seizure and beating of two American service members, whom Japanese mobs beat for more than two hours. (Eichelberger Papers, Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan and Dictations, August 1946 and August 1947) Simultaneously, weapons, materials and even vehicles began missing from American warehouses, eventually finding their way into the hands of militant anti-American groups in Japan. With each passing month, the disappearance and theft of occupation materials increased, until it became a major issue for American security. Many of these materials emerged in the Japanese black market, which increased tenfold from 1945 to 1946. Since coal, rice, weapons, clothing and building materials were all in short supply, the black market quickly flourished in these items, threatening to overwhelm the legitimate Japanese economy.

Eichelberger quickly discovered that Korean personnel were responsible for many of his law enforcement problems. Korean nationals (and to a lesser extent Chinese-Formosans) ran pervasive black market operations. As Eichelberger noted, the Japanese had imported many thousands of foreigners as slave labor, especially Koreans. When the war ended, many chose to remain in Japan instead of returning to their homeland. Inspired by communist propaganda and led by foreign leaders who illegally entered Japan, these elements attempted to disrupt the Japanese economy and political system and "raise hell against the occupation." (Eichelberger 1950, 273-74; Eichelberger Papers, Dictations, 5 December 1960) Since Korea had fought the Japanese in World War II, occupation policies prohibited American authorities from taking action against these so-called "allies," allowing them to disrupt elections and economic activities for more than a year without interruption. As Eichelberger stated to a friend, "In addition to eighty million Japanese who are mostly on our side, there are 500,000 Koreans in here who are mostly bastards." (Eichelberger Papers, Personal Correspondence, 19 April 1948)

As these elements increased in number and boldness, they precipitated the second layer of problems that beset the occupation. In 1946, communist elements led by Korean leaders attempted to disrupt the first free democratic elections held in Japan. According to the Potsdam Declaration (or at least as MacArthur and Eichelberger interpreted it), the United States was not permitted to make any effort to influence the election, even if riots or disturbances were part of the political process. Shouted down, intimidated, and even beaten up, largely by communist-inspired mobs, campaigning political leaders faced increasing violence as the Eighth Army sat by and watched idly. After the creation of the initial Japanese government, problems persisted, as political agitation became the norm. In 1947, political agitators (mostly communist-inspired Koreans, according to Eichelberger), inspired by a series of fiery speeches, broke down the gates of the residence of Prime Minister Yoshida, and threatened him and his family. Although Yoshida was not hurt, the Japanese police were not able to control the situation until contingents of Eighth Army personnel armed with weapons reinforced them. (Eichelberger Papers, Dictations, 10 December 1953) Thereafter, labor unrest spread throughout Japan, with the communists gaining influence among labor unions, teachers and leftist political parties. Unions threatened general strikes throughout Japan, even though law forbade them, and the Eighth Army had to supervise the collection of taxes and the harvesting of crops, since dissident elements refused to cooperate with occupation policy.
The worst events occurred in 1948, when Korean dissidents precipitated riots in the cities of Osaka and Kobe. Allegedly based on Japanese discrimination against Korean schools and the use of Korean textbooks (which Eichelberger discounted as frivolous), Korean mobs gathered outside government buildings and eventually took hostage the Mayor and Chief of Police. The resulting riots and violence caused injuries to 16 Koreans and 22 Japanese police, with more than 400 arrested. Once again, the police were not able to control the situation, until Eighth Army personnel in large numbers reinforced them. (Eichelberger 1950, 274)

Even before this incident, however, Eichelberger decided to strengthen the Japanese police. Occupation policy had purged the police ranks of those belonging to paramilitary organizations, and limitations on the powers of the police in the new democratic system had prohibited them from infringing on constitutional liberties and the personal lives of the citizens. The result was a drastic diminution of the power and prestige of the Japanese police, now seen by some as "puppets" of the American occupation, and by others as disgraced public servants. Eichelberger attempted to increase their standing in the community by a variety of methods—pushing for higher pay, writing and publishing encouraging articles about police accomplishments, and taking publicity photos next to Japanese police in order to increase their public prestige. Furthermore, without any instructions from MacArthur, Eichelberger allowed the police to protect the Japanese Emperor and important government officials with physical force. Despite some concern that this was a violation of the Potsdam Declaration, Eichelberger later declared this as one of his most important decisions, since it strengthened the role of the police in Japanese society and protected the elected officials from unwarranted disruption and violence. (Perry 1980, 58-59; Yoshida 1962, 228-29)

More importantly, Eichelberger recognized the need for better-armed Japanese police. Although the initial Occupation directives did not expressly forbid the disarming of the Japanese police, members of MacArthur's staff insisted that they be included in subsequent orders for disarmament. Eichelberger noted that the Eighth Army was almost "too successful" in the disarming of Japan, noting that in the central area of Honshu alone, more than 300,000 tons of explosives, munitions and firearms were confiscated and destroyed, with most of the firearms dumped at sea. Severe penalties for possession of unauthorized firearms reduced the quantity even further, with one female receiving "one year at hard labor" for having possession of a single unauthorized pistol. (Eichelberger Papers, Eighth Army Report, 1946) The result was that there were no Japanese firearms left by 1947 to arm the Japanese police, leaving the police with only sticks and batons. Eichelberger subsequently decided to arm them with American pistols, but faced adamant opposition from MacArthur's headquarters, who violently opposed the idea. Forced to arm them "quietly" and "unofficially," Eichelberger stated with pride in 1947 that he was successful in arming 18,000 of the 120,000 Japanese police with American-made .45's. (Chwialkowski 1998, 726; Eichelberger Papers, Memorandums and Dictations, 16 January 1946 and 20 May 1960)

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Even before 1947, however, Eichelberger recognized that "passing out a few pistols" would not solve the security problems of Japan. Politically conservative, Eichelberger watched with alarm as "New Dealers," progressive elements that wanted to remake Japan according to
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Roosevelt's 1930's programs, filled MacArthur's staff. He had no opposition to efforts that revitalized the Japanese economy, but opposed efforts encouraging the creation of labor unions and the implementation of a strict "hands off" policy for Japanese elections. Dominated by radical left wing elements, labor unions emerged which were successful in electing socialists and even communists to the Japanese government. Even worse, these same elements were responsible for threats against the existing government leaders, threatening general strikes and political violence.

More importantly, Eichelberger decried the progressive elements who wrote the Japanese Constitution, especially the clause that outlawed law as an instrument of national policy. In part, the clause stated, "The Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes . . . In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air power, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained." Eichelberger believed that General MacArthur supported and even initiated this clause himself, since he repeatedly referred to Japan as "the Switzerland of the Far East." As Eichelberger commented, the "provision which America wrote into the Japanese constitution before it was adopted concerning the outlawing of war as an instrument of government policy and the doing away with Japanese Armed Forces has embarrassed our leaders and far-sighted Japanese leaders, almost since its adoption." (Eichelberger Papers, Dictations, 20 December 1954 and 23 May 1949)

By 1948, Eichelberger had made an amazing transformation. During World War II, he had commanded the Eighth Army in military operations in New Guinea and the Philippines, and personally been shot at by Japanese snipers. In letters to his wife during the war, he freely admitted that he "hated" the Japanese. When the Japanese surrendered, he stated that the Japanese did not seem ready to admit that they lost the war, and recommended dropping "a few more bombs" on them for assurance. Time magazine, who did a story on him shortly after the occupation started, stated that Eichelberger (as the "number two man" in Japan) would be "tough" but fair and that the Japanese could expect "no favors." (Time, 10 September 1945, 31-32) By 1948, however, Eichelberger concluded that Japanese rearmament was necessary, and that Japan would potentially be America's greatest ally if conflict began in the Far East. As the number of occupation troops dropped during 1948, reportedly to a low of 50,000, Eichelberger argued that the Japanese ability to defend themselves was imperative, especially if the depleted Eighth Army were drawn off in a shooting war with the communists.

Eichelberger had no confusion about the future enemies of the United States, arguing as early as 1946 that the Communist Chinese and Russians would provide problems for American interests in the Far East. He noted that, unlike the Americans, the Russians did not destroy Japanese munitions, but merely redistributed them to the Chinese communists. The Russians clearly had "interests" in the northern islands of Japan, and repeatedly tried to send military forces to assist the Americans in the occupation of Japan (fortunately, the U.S. State Department rebuffed these efforts). (Eichelberger Papers, Personal Correspondence, 22 February 1946) Since Korea was also part of the Eighth Army's zone of operations, Eichelberger was very aware of the problems with the communists in this area, and predicted military conflicts in this country four years before the initial hostilities of the Korean War.
Eichelberger kept most of his reservations to himself until 1948, when he felt compelled to have an open break with MacArthur. The precipitating event was MacArthur's suggestion that the occupation could be quickly "wrapped up," since most of the aims of the occupation had been completed, allowing the removal of the American occupation forces. MacArthur stated that the national security of Japan could be "guaranteed" by a peace treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, which would leave Japan unarmed and "neutral," and indicated that he had instructed the State Department to work on such a treaty. Eichelberger was appalled and alarmed. Believing that the occupation should last at least eight years, Eichelberger felt that it was "unimaginable" to base Japan's security on an agreement with the Soviet Union, which he believed could not be trusted. Furthermore, in letters to his friends, he stated that the real reasons for the "treaty" were self-serving; MacArthur could declare his mission in Japan as "accomplished," and return to the United States "in triumph" to run for the Presidency of the United States. (According to Eichelberger, MacArthur had always been jealous and suspicious of Eisenhower, and was aware that his European counterpart shared similar aspirations for the presidency; MacArthur felt much more accomplished than "Ike," who had once been his Chief of Staff in the Philippines before World War II). In a statement to the press in 1948, Eichelberger attempted to rebuff MacArthur's efforts, stating that the time for the end of the occupation was not at hand. A force of "armed constabulary," which should number at least 125,000 armed with rifles and machine guns, he stated, should protect Japan. He immediately received tremendous pressure from MacArthur's headquarters, who forced him to backtrack on his statements. (Eichelberger Papers, Personal Correspondence and Dictations, 22 February 1948 and 27 September 1957)

The Fight for Japanese Security

Partly because of this pressure, and his misgivings over the direction of MacArthur's policies, Eichelberger decided to step down as commander of the Eighth Army and retire from the military. In August 1948, he had his last strained meeting with MacArthur and departed for the United States, but quickly accepted a job in Washington where he could influence events in Japan. As an expert and consultant on the Far East, he worked with Tracy Voorhees, the Under Secretary of the Army, who was also responsible for occupied territories. In this assignment, he continued to argue for at least an armed constabulary for Japan, with his preference being the creation of a small, armed defense force of 250,000. In this quest, he joined with a group of powerful lobbyists and former military men who were critical of MacArthur's occupation policies. These included Harry Kern, editor of Newsweek, William Draper (Under Secretary of the Army), Assistant Secretary of State Charles Saltzman, Joseph Dodge (a prominent Detroit banker later given economic responsibilities in Japan), and a dozen other retired military and government officials. These men formed an unofficial group called the American Council for Japan, and demonstrated some political muscle when they arranged a reception for high-ranking Army Department and State Department officials. Having Eichelberger, the "number two" ranking occupation official, participate in this meeting was invaluable, since he argued persuasively that Japan must be given some form of self-protection in the event of hostilities in the Far East. It also helped that the prime minister of Japan and several Japanese mayors, who frantically wrote letters urging Eichelberger to speak on their behalf to authorities in Washington, supported the Council. (Sebold 1965, 249; Schaller 1985, 139-40; Eichelberger Papers, Personal Correspondence, 30 October 1948 and 22 December 1948)
As a retired military officer, Eichelberger felt that he had more freedom to be critical of
MacArthur and express his true feelings; starting in 1949, he went on several speaking tours,
where he reiterated the need for allowing Japan some form of defense force. The topic of his
talks was always Japanese security, and he stated the same basic themes, as follows:

The United States sponsored Japan in adopting a Constitution which outlaws war. We
have an obligation to make sure that Japan will be able to look after its own
security before we withdraw our authority. . . . (Eichelberger Papers, Press
Releases, 27 July 1949)

There are only two ways [to keep Russia out of the arms of the Russian bear]:
we must be prepared to defend Japan, or Japan must be armed so that she can
defend herself. There are no other possibilities . . . (Eichelberger 1950, 287)

Having introduced democracy into Japan and a Constitution which renounced
war, it is evident that we have assumed an obligation which requires us to protect
Japan until we grant her the right to organize ground forces for her own defense. . .
. (Eichelberger Papers, Memorandum, 14 February 1950)

The United States is not powerful enough at the present time to guarantee the
absolute safety of Japan from Soviet Russia and her satellites. Japan, with her
brave sons, must furnish the balance of power in her own country which will deter
aggression . . . (Eichelberger Papers, Press Releases, 21 April 1953)

The greatest contribution that Japan can make to peace in the future is for that
country to be armed within the limits of her economic ability particularly in the
field of ground forces . . . (Eichelberger Papers, Newspapers Articles, 22 April
1953)

My country has worldwide commitments and Japanese boys, in their proud
tradition of bravery in the face of an enemy, can take the place of American boys
who are needed elsewhere. The reported size of the projected defensive force
which has been noted in the press as 160,000 is not sufficient for the defense of
Japan's shores, but is certainly a step in the right direction . . . (Eichelberger
Papers, Press Releases, 9 March 1954)

In support of his arguments, Eichelberger stated that the cost of the occupation was
approximately $1 million dollars a day and $400 million a year, a cost unfair for American
taxpayers to bear indefinitely. He noted that American forces were the "most expensive military
in the world," since they were well-equipped and included "education" privileges and "pensions."
The Japanese soldiers, he argued, were just as brave and maintained at a much lower cost, since
they had proven during the war to be a formidable force armed only with outdated weapons and
"handfuls of rice." Eichelberger argued that the creation of a Japanese military force would be
much more cost effective, even if the United States had to spend millions to initially arm and
train such a force.
In private correspondence, Eichelberger eventually concluded that it was a mistake to push for the unconditional surrender of Japan. The destruction and disarmament of the Japanese military, he argued, had only upset the balance of power in the Far East and allowed the communists to fill the vacuum. It would be better if the United States arrived at some sort of negotiated peace, which would allow the Japanese to fend off the communists in China and Korea. Eichelberger privately worried that the United States had won the war but "lost the peace" in Asia by insisting on Japanese disarmament, and warned publicly that Japan was the "key" to any efforts to preserve peace and democracy in the Far East. (Eichelberger Papers, Personal Correspondence, Press Releases and Military Reports, 5 February 1948 and 16 January 1950)

Success

Despite Eichelberger's misgivings, most of his efforts met with success. Largely because of his work and the warnings of his friends and allies, in 1948 the War Department decided to oppose MacArthur's efforts for an early peace treaty and examine the creation of some type of defense force for Japan. In 1950, according to the suggestions made by Eichelberger and the American Council for Japan, the National Police Reserve emerged, numbering 75,000, which was intended as a weak but reliable substitute for the dismantling of the Imperial Japanese Army. With the initiation of hostilities in Korea, greater efforts were made to make those forces consistent with a true national military force, but consistent with the language of the Constitution. There was also a recognition that Japan would have to serve as a non-neutral supply base for operations in Korea, and provide a defense force suitable enough to defend her borders. Any efforts to ensure Japanese security via Japan's "neutrality" ended, and supporters of an armed Japan received strong backing, especially as the Korean War stagnated. In 1952, the same year the American Occupation of Japan was officially ended, the Japanese defense force was renamed the National Safety Force and, in 1954, renamed the Self Defense Forces. The creation of the Japanese Defense Forces was consistent with the philosophy of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, who hoped to limit Japan's homeland security to strictly a self-defense policy, while at the same time cooperating with the United States, who was entangling itself in various Cold War commitments. (Olson 2004, 2-3; Eichelberger Papers, Personal Correspondence, 9 November 1953) The result was the creation of a credible armed force, but one limited to self-protection and unencumbered by obligations to defend the United States or U.S. interests abroad. This beefed-up defense force was enough to ensure Japan's homeland security, in cooperation with the power of the United States, but not so large as to burden the economic development of Japan or its economic relationships in the region.

Conclusion

The result has been the creation of a Japanese defense force that is credible, limited in purpose, streamlined, and consistent with its Constitution. Many authors have remarked favorably on its structure and limited focus, implying that the United States could learn some lessons from Japan's model, while at the same time criticizing Japan for not doing more to assist the United States in its war against terrorism. Historians and scholars should not forget, however, that Japan's homeland security policy was forged by fire under the stress of the
American Occupation of Japan following World War II. The very existence of an independent homeland security force was in doubt, and almost did not occur, especially if MacArthur and his staff had implemented their plans. Men like Eichelberger and the American Council for Japan emerged as the true heroes in this fight, for it was their efforts that prevented the creation of a disastrous policy for Japan and the Far East. The limitations and strengths of Japan's homeland security are the direct result of these men and their struggles, now largely forgotten by history. More research is necessary on this subject, especially if we are to understand the strengths, weaknesses, and limitations of Japan's current policies. If Japan provides a model for other nations, perhaps the best lessons emanate from a re-examination of the history of the United States, especially as it pertains to U.S. operations abroad in the critical period following World War II.
References

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