

Photo # K-39927 USS Liberty in Chesapeake Bay, 29 July 1967



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<http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-l/agtr5.htm>

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USS *Liberty*: An Argument for a Network Centric Program for Command and Control

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Abstract: This paper will contribute to the support for a network centric program as is currently being tested and fielded by the Brigade Modernization Command (BMC) of the US Army. One feature that the BMC is currently assessing is the Network Integration Evaluation (NIE). It is a series of semi-annual evaluations designed to establish a network centric program and then rapidly build and mature the U.S. Army's tactical network. This paper promotes the integration by demonstrating that an impulse response could be generated as a result of defective command and control constructs. By examining the attack on the USS *Liberty*, a set of case studies will allow us to follow the events that generate conflict and cooperation which acts as a function of regional conflict within a much larger dynamic system which could produce incorrect and erroneous information and may ultimately lead to disastrous results.

1.0 Introduction:

Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the executive branch of the United States has generated a series of National Security Strategy documents designed to quantify and manage the major concerns in terms of the national security of the United States. The National Security Strategy (NSS) document is the focal guide for the National Military Strategy (NMS) that is generated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as a tangible product to be delivered to the Secretary of Defense.

The NMS document formulates the military objectives against those threats perceived to be of greatest concern to the national security. The NSS of 2012 generated a conceptual model that would give guidance for the joint activities of the Armed Forces of the United States. Because the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) forecasted a future of multinational and interagency operations, the doctrine would provide military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs). According to the NMS document:

“Rapid urbanization is changing the physical and political face of nations. In many places, this rapid urbanization has overburdened already weak infrastructures, scarce resources, and fragile economic bases. This population concentration has ensured that many future military operations will be taking place in urban areas. US forces must be prepared to conduct effective joint urban operations (JUOs) more than ever before.”¹

At the centre of the issue is the ability of the US force structure to perform large-scale operations by a combination of military forces and non-military organizations. The structure combines one or more of the elements with other types of operations such as foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, support to insurgency, or support to counterinsurgency. These operations are called complex contingency operations. At this, because the US force structure will most likely engage in more complex contingency operations to help secure unstable nation-states, nation build and to seek out and destroy non-state transnational and criminal organizations, network centric warfare and the associated platforms will help accelerate the pace of movement of the force structure. Accelerating the rapid movement of the separate elements in the force structure with near simultaneous dissemination of information could ultimately be vital in aiding the US to impose the will of its national security and humanitarian policies onto the enemy and allow US forces to decide where and when to engage enemy combatants in an unrelenting tempo of operations.²

Hence, it reinforces the Clausewitzian dictum that war is ultimately a conflict of wills. The US has repeatedly used “shock and awe” to intimidate, impose fear and promote the inevitability of destruction upon the enemy. It accomplishes exactly what past historical world powers have proficiently verified, that the “shock” of perception or reality of the overwhelming ability to influence and/or control the events of the adversary supports long lasting effects and imposes the acuity of “awe”.

¹ U.S Department of Defense (DoD) *Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations*. 16 September 2002.

² U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) C4ISR Cooperative Research Program. *NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority*. August 1999.

While the concept of shock and awe is designed to eliminate the will of the enemy to fight by defeating the opposing forces and leaving the enemy exhausted ó physically and emotionally, complex contingency operations will have to rely on the near simultaneous dissemination of information. The hard core assumption of this paper is predicated upon the use of network centric equipment which follows the logical evolution of progressive warfare. Comprehending that while the deployments of network centric equipment gives the US wonderful opportunities in aiding the US force structure a historical examination of miscommunication and the fragmentation of information will be assessed in this paper.

2.0 Historical Event:

During the 1967 Arab-Israeli War also called the Six-Day War, a combined army of Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian forces prepared to lead a coordinated attack on Israel. Due to accurate intelligence by the Israeli agencies, Israel preempted the conflict which was decisive and resulted in favor of Israel. While the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) was successful, an unintended consequence was the attack on USS *Liberty*. Because of the attack on the USS *Liberty*, there has developed a litany of conspiracy theories surrounding the attack. An examination of motives and situation failures could illuminate the event. A continuous scope of successive components may often be indistinguishable from the whole. Considering international relations, events that generate conflict between nation-states are derived and defined by their relationship. In a continuum, a progressive dynamic relationship may be defined as in a state of flux where conflict or cooperation is often the driving factor.

The bi-polar events of conflict and cooperation can be witnessed as being on a sliding scale, they may also be covariant of each other and using empirical analysis this paper will demonstrate how a regional conflict may be the proxy of a much larger conflict. In the end this paper aims at clarifying the causes of the attack of the USS *Liberty* as a function of independent variables that is derived from a relationship of conflict and cooperation. The central hypothesis of this paper is:

H₀: An impulse response is likely to be generated as a result of conflict and cooperation and thus as a function of regional conflict within a much larger dynamic system which could generate grave errors.

This hypothesis will draw upon logic and empirical analysis from theories such as balance of power and deterrence. At this, a definition of an impulse response must be explained. An impulse response may be defined as a reaction within a dynamic system. It is a response to an external change. An impulse response describes the reaction of the system as a function of time or frequency that parameterizes the dynamic behavior of the much larger system.³ From this we can demonstrate that the attack of the USS *Liberty* may be explained as an impulse response. As stated by Kenneth Waltz, a prominent scholar in international relations, balance of power theory argues that, "they (nation-states) are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination."⁴ This theory reinforces the

claim by Thucydides where the powerful do what they please and the less powerful suffer what they must.⁵

Coupled with the reference of balance of power, will be the reference to deterrence theory which, as stated by Bernard Brodie, an American military nuclear strategist, "The approaches to security can be described as preventive war, pre-emptive attack and massive retaliation – which reflect an idea congenial to modern military thinking, that of seize the initiative and carry the fight to the enemy."⁶ The hard core assumption of this paper will demonstrate that an impulse response in a dynamic system is derived from the notion that the two (2) sets of theories may be central in explaining how the components of the system could in the least give an understanding of what causes may probabilistic generate future events.

3.0 Situation:

On 23 May 1967, President Gamal Abdel Nasser ordered the blockade of the Straits of Tiran so that no Israeli ships or any ships carrying strategic goods could supply the Israeli city of Eilat.⁷ According to Edgar O'Ballance the author of *The Third ARAB-ISRAELI War*, also called the Six-Day War, this specific event made war between Israel and an Arab coalition composed of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq inevitable. The Six-Day War was just one of four (4) conflicts between the two (2) sets of dyads. It was a continuation of war between Israel and the Arab coalition of nation-states. Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl both claim:

"Israel and the Arab states have clashed over the same pieces of territory four (4) times since 1948."⁸ Goertz and Diehl continue to assert that, "If such militarized relationships last long enough, the rivalry becomes enduring. Wars, crises, disputes, and conflict management all occur within the context of the rivalry relationships."⁹

This statement is vital because it demonstrates that regional conflict may in fact be a part of a much larger dyadic relationship. In the case of the Six-Day War, it could be viewed as a component of the much larger event called the Cold War. The focus on regional conflict as a proxy of a much larger and much more potentially dangerous dyad may best be suited to answer the question of why an ally of the United States attacked the USS *Liberty*.

4.0 Mission of the USS *Liberty*

According to Retired USN Capt. Wyman H. Packard, the USS *Liberty* was designed as a surface collector of intelligence and indirect support to the US Navy, yet it was under the technical direction and control of the National Security Agency (NSA). It was titled as a research ship and its primary mission was to collect SIGINT or Signal Intelligence.¹⁰ The USS *Liberty* was also designed and constructed to collect data for electronic propagation studies and to investigate advanced communications systems. Because the USS *Liberty* was under the direct

control of the NSA the mission of the USS *Liberty* may have been to collect the unintended signals emissions from both Israel and/or the United Arab Republic (UAR). The unintentional intelligence bearing signals could then be analyzed and with information processing equipment, the conducted emissions (CE) could disclose information transmitted and received from both combatants. Since the 1970s the NSA has been tasked with the responsibility of securing conducted emissions signals and analyzing and interpreting those signals. This task may have been what facilitated the attack. Generating two (2) case scenarios may allow the event to be studied and analyzed.

5.0 Case Studies:

5.1 Case 1

While the actual confrontation lasted but six days, an action that almost caused World War III must be examined. Stimulated by the desire to explain how such an event could have brought the two (2) super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, into direct conflict a set of circumstances that could have probabilistically generated the impulse response have been proliferated. One set of circumstances that best explain the event is as such:

H₁: The Israeli attack on the USS *Liberty* was done in collusion with the United States to generate a massive response against the United Arab Republic (UAR) coalition to ensure the complete disintegration of Soviet influence in that region.

Deterrence theory assumes that conflict is inevitable, so in order to avoid or in the least curtail massive international conflict, the response must be so overwhelming that the challenger would not risk its very survival and thus the weaker nation-states would align themselves and emerge in a cooperative state of flux among asymmetric dyads with highly aligned preferences.

In line with this thought, an examination by Israeli revisionist scholars has come forward to address that perhaps the survival of Israel may not have been at stake. Haim Hanegbi, an Israeli political columnist for the daily *Ma'Ariv* newspaper stated, "The war of June 1967 has not been fully researched, and much about it remains classified. Israeli hearts may still be unprepared for the difficulty involved in criticizing the war that was viewed not only as the greatest military victory in modern history it must be remembered that in 1967 the army was still commanded by former members of the Palmach (elite fighting units of the Israeli War of Independence) who were burning to exploit the Six-Day War to complete what was denied them in 1948: the takeover of Palestinians' remaining territories and, through the power of conquest, realize the true Greater Israel (specifically all of Jerusalem)." ¹¹

To corroborate this claim by Haim Hanegbi, the then director of Ministry of Defense, Shimon Peres stated, "After Dayan was appointed Defense Minister, I submitted to him a certain proposal which, in my opinion then ó and in my opinion today, nearly three decades later ó would have deterred the Arabs and prevented the war. My proposal, which, by the way, Yigael Yadin (the military advisor to Prime Minister Levi Eshkol) knew about and supported, was considered ó and rejected." ¹²

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To comprehend the importance of Mr. Peres's proposal of deterrence, Mr. Peres, as claimed by Peter Hounam the author of *OPERATION CYANIDE Why the Bombing of the USS Liberty Nearly Caused World War III*, (Shimon Peres) was a director in the Ministry of Defense, where, with covert French help, had masterminded the construction of a reactor and plutonium separation plant near Dimona in the Negev Desert.¹³ Mr. Hounam continues to claim that Mr. Peres suggested a nuclear weapons detonation in an unpopulated area, to demonstrate Israel's invincibility.

These sets of events must be given to demonstrate the Israeli frame of mind regarding the Six-Day War in which the USS *Liberty* was attacked. On the US side Mr. Hounam asserts that the USS *Liberty* was ordered along the coast of Egypt and Israel without an escort. From the President Johnson Library, Hounam states that the received orders for the USS *Liberty* were, "USS *Liberty* is a clearly marked United States ship in international waters, not a participant in the conflict and not a reasonable inadvertent attack, and jet fighters from the Sixth Fleet carrier force could be overhead in less than ten minutes. Every commanding officer has authority to withdraw from danger. Request for escort denied."¹⁴ Considering the amount of contingencies and redundancies the US military practices, an armed escort being denied for an electronic surveillance ship is puzzling and suggests an act of collusion on the part of the United States. A memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Lyndon B. Johnson describes the sympathy of Congress towards Israel:

Washington, June 1, 1967, 1p.m.

Mr. President:

1. The clear majority sentiment in the House of Representatives is pro-Israel. They feel Israel is being pushed around by Nasser. 2. They are worried about the effect of the passage of time on Israel with respect to the build-up of Egyptian forces in the Sinai and the debilitating consequences for the Israeli economy.¹⁵

While the majority of Congress held a pro-Israel stance, events up to the hour of the attack on the USS *Liberty* demonstrate that Israel had routed the Egyptian military and had broken a cease fire agreement by sending Israeli tanks into northwestern Jordan. According to the President's daily brief on 8 June 1967, "The ultimate aim of such a movement might be to attack Syria. The embassy also says fighting on the Israeli-Jordanian front picked up during the night. [3 lines of source text not declassified]"¹⁶

At this, President Johnson sent a message via Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin that two American jets were flying over the Sinai, after a massive tank battle between Egypt and Israel, to assist the American ship USS *Liberty*. According to Hounam, "Nasser smelt a double cross all the time. First of all, there were the American planes over Egyptian positions. Secondly, the message was passed through Kosygin, so it was not directed at Egypt; it was directed at the Russians in an effort to neutralize the Soviet Union, blinding them against an operation being

conducted against Egypt. Thirdly, he learnt that the USS *Liberty* was a spy ship which had been listening in to Egypt's communications and deciphering them. He (Nasser) questioned the final destination of those decoded messages. In the end, Nasser began to see the shape of collusion.¹⁷

Israel had soundly defeated the Egyptian military; it expanded its control throughout the entire Sinai Peninsula; it took total control of the capital Jerusalem and was pushing into Jordan with little regard for a cease-fire. For what purpose was Israel increasing its benefits? Jack S. Levy a professor of political science at Rutgers University claims that, "the Israeli seizure of the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt and subsequent return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt as part of the 1979 peace treaty is an example of "bargaining chips." He continues to assert, "The asymmetry of value attached to concessions given and compensation received is likely to be much less, which minimizes the concession aversion. It is clear that the Israeli leaders regarded the Sinai as a bargaining chip for substantial peace."¹⁸

It can be inferred that Israel, after the decimation of the Egyptian military and control of the Sinai, began to act recklessly and pushed onward to totally break any military strength the Arab coalition might have possessed. The United States was concerned with the Soviet Union influence and it also sought to get rid of Nasser, which the US believed was a Russian puppet. In the end, Israel increased its territory to facilitate the end of the United Arab Republic (UAR) and the resignation of Nasser, with the USS *Liberty* being a casualty.

A memo from the LBJ Library between McGeorge Bundy, the National Security Advisor at the time, and John McNaughton, the General Counsel in the Department of Defense, McNaughton stated that the US would do well to find solutions that would disengage the situation in Vietnam because the realization of victory in that war seemed highly unlikely. McNaughton continued to assert that massive diversionary offensives elsewhere in the world could possibly intimidate Ho Chi Minh into suing for peace.¹⁹ Hounam claimed to have interviewed a retired US Air Force pilot, Jim Nanjo. Nanjo stated that on 8 June 1967 the day the USS *Liberty* was attacked, he and his squadron were on a mission to "nuke" Egypt and the Soviet Union, but because the USS *Liberty* did not sink, the mission was aborted.²⁰ The attack on the USS *Liberty* as an impulse response that was generated to cause a massive retaliation to ensure American superiority may seem plausible given the much larger conflict between the US and the USSR.

In 1967 during the Six-Days War and specifically 8 June 1967 at the time of the attack on the USS *Liberty*, the United States was simultaneously engaged militarily against the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong and perhaps the attack on the USS *Liberty* would have allowed the US to demonstrate its seriousness against Ho Chi Minh by generating a massive retaliation against Egypt. Considering that President Johnson had in the past used opacity to rouse the American public to war it may be reasoned through causality that the US could do it again. The Gulf of Tonkin incident could be compared to the attack on the USS *Liberty*, but what if Israel intentionally attacked the USS *Liberty*?

4.2 Case 2

While Israel was on the verge of totally obliterating the Arab coalition forces, the USS *Liberty* found itself among one of the targets. Why would a United States ally deliberately attack the USS *Liberty* can best be explained by examining the circumstances from the viewpoint of Israel. Golda Meir in her oral autobiography explains, "In 1957 we had been promised that if we evacuated Gaza, Egyptian soldiers would never enter Gaza. When Nasser closed the straits, (Tiran) they remained closed we waited for the family of nations to overturn this, but in the end we had to go it alone."²¹ The idea that Israel was prepared to "go it alone" demonstrates the hypothesis as such:

H₂: Israel bombed the USS *Liberty* because Israel felt its military advantage against the United Arab Republic (UAR) was being compromised by its own ally the United States.

Balance of Power theory was designed and constructed by Kenneth N. Waltz. In his book, *Theory of International Politics* Robert O. Keohane argues that the theory's main doctrine is intended to prevent any one nation from becoming sufficiently strong so as to enable it to enforce its will upon the rest. Using balance of power theory to direct the analysis of the attack on the USS *Liberty*, Keohane quotes Waltz as stating, "Wars among states cannot settle questions of authority and right; they can only determine the allocation of gains and losses among contenders and settle for a time the question of who is stronger."²²

At this, the attack on the USS *Liberty* may have been a defensive measure against the United States because Israel felt the United States was sending vital information to Egyptian forces so as to limit the amount of success Israel was experiencing.

In their book, *The Secret War Against The Jews*, John Loftus and Mark Aarons claim that, "Egyptian artillery moved to close the Red Sea to any vessel flying the Israeli flag and blockaded the Israeli city-port of Eilat in the Straits of Tiran."²³ With this act Israel claimed the United Arab Republic (UAR) and specifically Egypt violated international law and Israel specifically, Golda Meir²⁴, claimed the only response the United Nations gave was to remove its Emergency Force out of the Sinai Peninsula. Israel reasoned that if the UN removed its Emergency Force then it was prepared to engage the UAR unilaterally. O'Ballance in his book *The Third ARAB-ISRAELI War* claims, "On the Fourth Day the Egyptian forces in the Sinai witnessed a general collapse."²⁵ The Israelis with their air power secured total victory and it seemed the Johnson administration became worried over the response by the Arab nation-states. On 6 June 1967 a statement from the US Department of State to the Embassy in France stated:

ø1. For variety of reasons we prefer hold up on previously-authorized sale of remaining 143 half-tracks to Israel at this sensitive time. While sale is unlikely to alter military arms balance in

current hostilities there could be political risks in associating the US with transaction of visible military hardware at this moment. We intend however to keep issue under review. 2. You should find pretext which not related to Middle East crisis to delay action on Israeli request.²⁶

It appears the United States was concerned with the balance of power in the Middle East and the then Secretary of State Dean Rusk voiced his concerns via a telegram to the US Embassy in Israel:

1. I believe that the GOI (Government of Israel) must look to its own interest in the Arab world. The presence of Jordan and the King has been a stabilizing influence which I do not believe the Israelis should lightly see go down the drain. 2. I hope you will find a way to suggest most forcefully to the Israelis that they arrange in the aftermath of the Security Council resolution an immediate cease-fire at least de facto with Jordan. I leave to you the nature of the approach and caution you that we do not want to get in a position of trying to direct Israeli tactics, particularly military ones. In the light of unfounded charges of the last couple of days (the Arab coalition believed that the US was directing the combat), any such implication would be dangerous indeed. I do, however, think you may be able carefully to handle this as a matter of interest to the Israelis.²⁷

On 7 June 1967, the day before the attack on the USS *Liberty*, during the Presidents Daily Brief the National Security Council discussed the Israeli air force hammering of Jordanian positions despite the cease fire.²⁸ To collaborate President Johnson's concern with the Israeli air force attacks on Jordan, Loftus and Aaron states, "On the night of 7 June, Mossadí knew that their deception plan had been spotted by the Americans (Israel had decoded the Arab coalition messages and were sending the Jordanians false information that the war for Nasser was going well and that Jordan should join in the attack). When the Israeli Ambassador protested, he was informed in diplomatic language, that the United States knew that Jordan had been lured into fighting by signal deception. It was obvious that, if the USS *Liberty* continued with her transmissions, it could be disastrous for Israel as they would be able to reveal that the Israelis were in violation of a UN cease-fire order."²⁹

At this, while it appears the United States was concerned with the balance of power, Israel may have been concerned with its image to the world community and the attack on the USS *Liberty* may have been viewed as a necessity. Yet in the course of combat the chaos that ensues often creates impulse responses generated with the thought of self-preservation.

4.3 Case 3

Israel has continually maintained that its attack on the USS *Liberty* was a mistake and the United States has been satisfied to accept that answer. In the Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968 Volume XIX Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967 index, a recorded statement by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board conducted an investigation that

demonstrated a series of mistakes made by the Israeli Defense Forces. At this, a restatement of the general hypothesis must be generated as such:

H₃: The continuum sliding scale of conflict and cooperation in a dynamic system can be chaotic and is often induced with an impulse response that ultimately generates serious errors.

The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) generated and compiled a series of mistakes that ultimately exposed the USS *Liberty* to an impulse response and specifically an attack by Israel. From the Foreign Relations Volume XIX:

Mistake 1. The Israeli Navy and Air Force received a number of erroneous reports that Israeli positions in the city of El Aris were being bombarded from sea after the Israelis overran the city.

Mistake 2. The IDF received reports that an unidentified ship was streaming at thirty knots and from *Janes Fighting Ships* (a reference catalog of world navies and ships) the capabilities of the USS *Liberty* claimed its maximum speed was at eighteen knots. This led the IDF to believe the ship traveling at thirty knots was an enemy ship.

Mistake 3. The IDF dispatched motor boats that misidentified the USS *Liberty* as the *El Quesir*, an Egyptian supply ship. IDF standing orders were to attack any ship cruising above twenty knots.³⁰

To validate the Israeli claim of attacking the USS *Liberty* as a set of regrettable errors, an Intelligence Memorandum prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which was ultimately turned over to the Office of the Judge Advocate states:

Washington, June 21, 1967

SUBJECT:

The Israeli Statement on the Attack on the USS *Liberty*

First Mistake: It was decisive and set the scenario for the subsequent errors. Based on erroneous reports the IDF was convinced that the Israeli positions were being shelled near El Arish. (CIA has no evidence of these erroneous reports, but the information is plausible in light of the very speedy Israeli advance and the heat of battle in the El Arish area).³¹ The CIA report continues by examining the ensuing mistakes made by the IDF.

Second Mistake: Three Israeli torpedo boats patrolling near the USS *Liberty* reported that the unidentified vessel was steaming at 28-30 knots. Considering the erroneous information on the shelling of Israeli coastal positions, the IDF asked torpedo boats to verify the unidentified vessel's speed and then ordered the air attack.³²

Third Mistake: The Israeli torpedo boats then joined the fray. They claimed they mistook the USS *Liberty* for the Egyptian transport *El Quesir* and attacked with torpedoes after Israeli jets

had broken off. This attack is explained by the over eagerness of the torpedo boat skippers as the jet pilots were already having their doubts as to the ship's identity.³³

The CIA also claimed that the unprofessional military performance can be found in a report from Tel Aviv that there was at least one torpedo boat officer who was a reservist recalled to duty during the mobilization.

5.0 Key Judgments

In the final analysis, the attack on the USS *Liberty* can best be explained as a mistake made by the IDF due to miscommunication and the fragmentation of information leading to an inaccurate picture of the battle-space. On 13 June 1967 a Defense Intelligence Agency memorandum generated to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff states:

“There is no available information which would conclusively show that the Israelis made a premeditated attack on a ship known to be American. In fact the best interpretation we can make of the available facts is that Israel command and control in this instance was defective.”³⁴

The CIA also concluded that the attack was not made in malice toward the US but rather incongruous and indicative of gross negligence.³⁵

Considering that Israeli commanders were overzealous in their belief of defending Israel and coupled with the chaotic circumstances not made lucid by a clear and effect command and control structure, an impulse response was most likely generated. It is the intent of the author that this paper should demonstrate that the research and data acquired be allowed to indicate that future trends in this research be integrated into a larger scientific research program. The DIA memorandum stated that the defective command and control spectrum might have led to the attack on the USS *Liberty*. The prominent emphasis should be on the impact of the construction of a network centric program on future complex contingency operations to eliminate induced impulse responses and that could ultimately generate serious errors. A network centric program exemplifies maturation within the chaotic circumstances of conflict itself as well as the ability to be combined with, or possibly even to subsume the relationship of conflict and cooperation.

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Notes:

¹ Parr, John, M., Phillips, Charles, L., Riskin, Eve. A. *Signals, Systems, and Transforms*. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc, 2003. (93-94)

² Kenneth Waltz, "Neorealism and its critics: *Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power* (1989): 117. 14 March 2010.

³ Thucydides, "History of Peloponnesian War: The Melian Conference." 431 BC.

⁴ Bernard Brodie, "Strategy in the Missile Age" (1959): 291. 14 March 2010.

⁵ O'Ballance, Edgar. *The Third Arab-Israeli War*. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1972. 14 March 2010.

⁶ Diehl, Paul F. Goertz, Gary. "Enduring Rivalries." *Handbook on War Studies II*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2000. 14 March 2010.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Packard, Wyman H. *A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence*. Washington D.C.: Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval Historical Center. 1996 (115-116) 22 March 2010.

⁹ Hounam, Peter. *Operation Cyanide*. "Why the Bombing of the USS Liberty Nearly Caused World War III." 2003 Hanegmi, Haim. "Where Are the Messiah's Footsteps?" *Ma'Ariv Supplement*, 14 June 1998. 14 March 2010.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. III. No classification marking. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates that it was received at 1:25 p.m

¹⁴ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 6, Appendix A. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified].

¹⁵ Hounam, Peter. *Operation Cyanide*. "Why the Bombing of the USS Liberty Nearly Caused World War III." 2003 Hanegmi, Haim. "Where Are the Messiah's Footsteps?" *Ma'Ariv Supplement*, 14 June 1998. 14 March 2010.

¹⁶ Levy, Jack, S. *Handbook of War Studies II*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, (2000): 212. 15 March 2010.

¹⁷ Hounam, Peter. *OPERATION CYANIDE Why the Bombing of the USS Liberty Nearly Caused World War III*. London, United Kingdom: Satin Publications, 2003. Memo to Bundy dated 10 March 1965, LBJ Library. 16 March 2010.

¹⁸ Ibid.

- ¹⁹ Syrkin, Marie. *Golda Meir Speaks Out*. Jerusalem, Israel: Steimatzky Agency, 1973
- ²⁰ Keohane, Robert, O. *Neorealism and Its Critics: Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power*. New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
- ²¹ Aarons, Mark, Loftus, John. *The Secret War Against the Jews*. New York, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.
- ²² Syrkin, Marie. *Golda Meir Speaks Out*. Jerusalem, Israel: Steimatzky Agency, 1973.
- ²³ Ballance, Edgar. *The Third Arab-Israeli War*. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1972.
- ²⁴ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1976-69 POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Battle and approved by Rusk.
- ²⁵ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 6, Appendix A Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. Regarding the release of this PDB, see footnote 1 Document 151.
- ²⁶ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 6, Appendix A Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. Regarding the release of this PDB, see footnote 1 Document 151.
- ²⁷ Aarons, Mark, Loftus, John. *The Secret War Against the Jews*. New York, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.
- ²⁸ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 6, Appendix A Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. Regarding the release of this PDB, see footnote 1 Document 151.
- ²⁹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files: Job 85-01007R, Box 5 Folder 50. Top Secret; Trine. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Intelligence.
- ³⁰ Ibid.
- ³¹ Ibid.
- ³² Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192.
- ³³ Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files: Job 85-01007R, Box 5 Folder 50. Top Secret; Trine. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Intelligence.