Pakistan: A Plethora of Problems

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Abstract

Even though it is not on the United States’ terrorism list, Pakistan has been one of the largest state supporters of terrorism over the last 25 years. Pakistan has used state-sponsored terrorism to aid in increasing its security in the region, especially with regard to India. After 9/11, the United States demanded assistance from Pakistan in overthrowing the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan was initially one the United States’ strongest allies and was rewarded in kind. Over the last five years though, Pakistan has played both sides of the fence by allowing the Taliban and al-Qaeda to use Pakistan for sanctuary to strengthen their numbers, especially in the Federally Administered Tribal Regions (FATA). Pakistan’s soft stance on enforcing its own borders has resulted in a severe weakening of its internal security. Now Pakistan must focus on India to the east as well as Afghanistan to the west.

Key Words: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Terrorism, Taliban, FATA, United States, Kashmir, India, ISI

Introduction

On May 1, 2011, United States’ Special Forces conducted a covert raid from Afghanistan a hundred and twenty miles across the Pakistan border into the city of Abbottabad in order to capture/kill the leader and mastermind behind al-Qaeda Osama bin Laden. The choice for bin Laden to hide from the United States in Abbottabad at first glance is somewhat ironic given that the city is home to Pakistan’s most prestigious military academy as well as a retirement community for many of Pakistan’s military. However if Pakistan was aware of bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad then it makes more sense as a secure hideout for bin Laden. Though no definitive evidence has been presented, American officials believe that bin Laden had help from the Pakistani government as well as its Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI) in hiding from the United States. In fact, in the lead up to operation, the Pakistan government had zero knowledge of the raid because of the “lack of confidence that the Pakistanis could keep this secret for more than a nanosecond” as stated by a senior adviser to President Barack Obama (Schmidle).

Pakistan was understandably upset by the violation of sovereignty. The government presented two faces: Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari, engaging in damage control, stated “a decade of cooperation and partnership between the United States and Pakistan led up to the elimination of Osama bin Laden,” while at the same time the Pakistani leadership
arrested at least five Pakistanis for helping the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the operation (Schmidle).

The fact that the operation against one of the most wanted terrorists in history occurred in Pakistan is fitting. Over the last thirty years Pakistan has proved to be the epicenter of the growing threat of the Salafi jihad that has spread from the region and involved a calculated political battle involving Afghanistan, India and the United States. During the same time, Pakistan played both ally and foe simultaneously to Afghanistan and the United States for the larger strategic vision against India.

Pakistan’s middling stance has come full circle and now haunts the country’s government officials. The terrorist groups it supported have grown out of its control and have lead to unrest on its borders with Afghanistan and India. Besides the bin Laden raid, the United States has conducted numerous attacks in Pakistan because of their inability to secure the situation within their country’s own borders. The current strategic course Pakistan is on will lead to ruin and not just for Pakistan.

Pakistan and Afghanistan

Although Pakistan is not on the United State’s list of state sponsor of terror, besides Iran it is probably the most active sponsor of terrorism (Byman, 155). The role as the center of the growing insurgency has been almost a self-fulfilling prophecy since its creation. After Great Britain granted India and Pakistan independence, the tension between predominately Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan existed from the beginning. The First Indo-Pakistani War was fought in 1947 over the territory of Kashmir which was the only Muslim-majority province of India that was not given to Pakistan after independence (Riedel, Deadly Embrace, 8).

On the other side of the country Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan is just as tenuous. The border was created in 1893 by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand who was the British Foreign Secretary of India at the time. In agreement with the Afghan ruler, Amir Abdur Rehman Khan, a line was drawn in order to separate the Pashtun tribes so that it would be easier for British forces to pacify the area. The 1,519 mile border is known as the Durand Line and no modern government of Afghanistan has formally recognized the British-drawn border (Jones 99). The British and ultimately Pakistan were never fully able to govern the Pashtun tribes on their side of the border and instead turned over the security of the area to the tribes themselves creating the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The area was intentionally kept “underdeveloped and overarmed as a barrier against invaders” (Rubin and Rashid, 5).

Support of the mujahideen fight against the Soviet Union began with the accession of Pakistani dictator, Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, who Bruce Riedel refers to as the “grandfather of global Islamic jihad” (Deadly Embrace, 20). Zia was openly an Islamist and aligned himself with Pakistan’s Islamic Jamaat-Islam Party. He also greatly increased the strength of the ISI.
The ISI had been created in 1948, by British Army Officer Major General William Cawthorne who served as the Pakistan army deputy chief of staff. Cawthorne created the ISI to counter the lack of intelligence and military cooperation Pakistan severely lacked during the 1947 Indo-Pakistan War (Jones, 30). Zia picked a Pashtun who knew Afghanistan very well: General Akhtar Abdur Rahman. Under Akhtar’s guidance, the ISI staff increased from 2,000 in 1978 to 40,000 members in 1988 with a billion-dollar budget making it “the most powerful and influential organization in the country” (Riedel, Deadly Embrace, 21).

Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in 1979 in effort to stabilize the budding civil war that was created in the country after Marxist officers in the Afghan army overthrew the country’s neutralist government. Akhtar provided Zia with an intelligence assessment that the Soviet invasion threatened Pakistan and advised Pakistan to back up the Afghan resistance in order to turn “Afghanistan into the Soviet Union’s Vietnam” (Jones, 30). Zia also sent Akhtar to Saudi Arabia to request assistance from Saudi King Fahd and his General Intelligence Directorate (GID). Soon the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) joined in and all funding and equipment from the GID and CIA was funneled through the ISI to the Afghan mujahideen. As described by Mohammad Yousaf, the chief of the ISI’s Afghan Bureau in the 1980s: “As soon as the arms arrived in Pakistan, the CIA’s responsibility ended. From then on it was our pipeline, our organization that moved, allocated and distributed every bullet that the CIA procured” (Riedel, Deadly Embrace, 25). In 1980 President Jimmy Carter’s administration had allocated $30 million for the Afghan resistance. Five years later in 1985 the U.S. Congress raised the amount to $250 million which increased to an annual amount of $630 million with matching dollar-for-dollar contributions from Saudi Arabia. On the other side, the Soviet Union was sinking over $5 billion per year to support its counterinsurgency efforts (Rubin, 6).

Not wanting to confront the Soviet Union directly for fear of a Soviet invasion of Pakistan, Zia ensured all support was done discreetly. Besides the influx of money and supplies the ISI also set up numerous training camps along the Durand Line. The camps were run by Pakistan’s elite Special Services Group (SSG) who instructed Afghan mujahideen “more sophisticated tactics and skills for waging jihad” during a ten-day or three-month course. By the end of the war, the ISI camps had trained at least 80,000 to 90,000 Afghans, including Muhammad Omar, the founder of the Taliban (Riedel, Deadly Embrace, 24).

Zia also had a secondary goal with the ISI camps: to begin training groups to conduct jihad in Kashmir and India. Zia promised leaders from the Jamaat-i-Islam party, which supported the use of force to create a separate Muslim state from Islam, that he “would use the war against the Soviet invaders to help build support base for a Kashmiri insurgency…and that some of the American assistance earmarked for the Afghan jihad would be diverted to the Kashmiri project and that the ISI would help with both” (Ibid). Jamaat-i-Islam was initially reluctant to trust the Pakistani government after being let down in the past, but by 1983 its members were training in the ISI run camps in Afghanistan. Akhtar also approached the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) in 1984 and its member were in the camps by 1987.
Pakistan and Kashmir

Pakistan was initially surprised by the Kashmiri unrest that occurred in 1989. The upheaval was caused by the harsh oppression from the Indian appointed Kashmir governor, Jagmohan. The militants used the draconian government as a way to justify their actions legitimizing the violence to the Kashmiri population. As noted by one Kashmiri official: “what Jagmohan did in five months they (the militants) could not have achieved in five years (Byman, 163).

Although Pakistan did not have an initial role in the Kashmir violence, it quickly took advantage of the situation. Buoyed by the recent defeat of the Soviet Union by the Afghan mujahideen, Pakistan viewed the support of the Kashmir insurgency as an opportune time to confront India indirectly with little fear of Indian military escalation. The JKLF eventually fell out of favor with Pakistan and was replaced by Islamist groups such as Hizb-ul-Mujahedin, Lashkar-e-Ta yyeba, Harkat-ul-Mujahedin and Jaysh-e Mohammad. The groups were trained by retired Pakistan military as well as the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the camps in Afghanistan. By 2001, there were over 90 Pakistan run training camps in Pakistan occupied Kashmir, while another estimated 200,000 militants went through the camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Kashmir. Violence in Kashmir increased from 390 incidents in 1988 to almost 4,000 in 1990 (Byman, 168-169; and Riedel, Deadly Embrace, 39).

The rise of violence in Kashmir also coincided with a lull in American-Pakistan relations. Both India and Pakistan significantly increased their troop presence along the border of Kashmir while at the same time also increasing their rhetoric with Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto declaring Pakistan would fight “for a thousand years to free Kashmir” (Riedel, Deadly Embrace, 41). With both countries on the brink of war, United States President George Bush dispatched a diplomacy team in an effort to prevent further escalation. At the same time the United States was concerned with Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities and its willingness to begin a nuclear war with India. In October 1990 President Bush also invoked the Pressler Amendment, mandating that U.S. aid to Pakistan would not be used to further its nuclear capacity. This cut-off all assistance to Pakistan immediately, including a delivery of F-16’s. Pakistan of course viewed the actions as the United States abandoning Pakistan now that the Soviet Union had been defeated (Ibid).

Pakistan and the Taliban

Ironically the Soviet Union had entered Afghanistan to prevent a civil war, but its withdrawal created an environment for another. Afghanistan President Muhammad Najibullah managed to hold on for three years after the Soviet Union left, but in 1992 mujahideen forces captured Kabul and ousted the communist president. None of the mujahideen commanders could claim complete control though which plunged Afghanistan into chaos. Out of the chaos the Taliban, a group of Islamic students many of who were educated in Pakistani madrassas, began to seize territory. In 1994, led by Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban seized Kandahar the second largest city in Afghanistan. By 1996 the Taliban had control of Kabul and effectively Afghanistan. The only remaining opposition
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came from Ahmed Shah Massoud, “the Lion of the Panjshir,” whose Northern Alliance retained control of between 5 and 10 percent of Afghan territory (Rubin, 11).

The rise of the Taliban was very similar to the situation in Kashmir: Pakistan did not create the Taliban, but quickly jumped in to support. Pakistan believed it could control the Taliban leadership and in essence gain control of Afghanistan through a proxy. Pakistan was the first country to recognize the Taliban government (the only other two being Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) and provided the Taliban with a great deal of military and economic aid. The ISI continued to train Taliban operatives in the Afghanistan camps that also trained Kashmiri insurgents, while Pakistani experts “handled the logistics to maintain and operate the Taliban’s more sophisticated weapons, including tanks and aircraft” (Riedel, *The Search for Al-Qaeda*, 65). In addition to military support, Pakistan provided ideological support through the country’s over 8,000 official and 25,000 unofficial madrassas. The Dar al-Ulum Haqqania school, which a disproportionate number of Taliban leadership was educated, had 15,000 applicants for only 400 spots in 1999 (Rubin, 13). As pointed out by Ahmed Rashid, a leading expert on the Taliban: “The Taliban…were not beholden to any single Pakistani lobby such as the ISI….In contrast the Taliban had access to more influential lobbies and groups in Pakistan than most Pakistanis” (Rubin, 12).

**The Taliban and Al-Qaeda**

Osama bin Laden, who had been a fixture in Afghanistan during the struggle against the Soviet Union, returned to Afghanistan in 1996 after being expelled by Sudan. With him he brought over 2,000 well-equipped and fiercely loyal fighters (Rubin, 14). Mullah Omar provided sanctuary for bin Laden and his al-Qaeda fighters, and in return bin Laden swore allegiance and fealty to the Commander of the Faithful, which Omar had titled himself, while also providing the fighters to assist the Taliban in its fight against the Northern Alliance (Riedel, *The Search for Al-Qaeda*, 67).

From its sanctuary in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda began its terrorist agenda against the United States by bombing the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. After U.S. intelligence traced the attacks back to al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, President Bill Clinton ordered cruise missile attacks against a training camp where bin Laden was rumored to be. Unfortunately, Bin Laden was not at the camp when the attack happened. Instead most of those killed were ISI trainers and fighters from Harakat ul Mujahedin, a Kashmiri insurgent group. U.S. intelligence assessed that attacks brought al-Qaeda and the Taliban closer together with one cable reporting: “Taliban leader Mullah Omar lashed out at the U.S. asserting that the Taliban will continue to provide a safe haven to bin Laden” (Jones, 83).

The connections between Pakistan, the Taliban, al-Qaeda and Kashmir were reinforced later when Kashmiri insurgents hijacked Air India flight 814 and diverted it to Kandahar. It was shown that the operation was a joint effort between the ISI, the Taliban, al-Qaeda and the Kashmiris, and was in fact a “dress rehearsal” for the 9/11 attacks. The United States attempted to directly persuade the Taliban as well with assistance from Pakistan to cease its support of bin Laden, but to no avail (Riedel, *The Search for Al-Qaeda*, 69-70).
The final action bonding the Taliban and al-Qaeda together occurred on September 9th, 2001. Two al-Qaeda terrorists, posing as Belgian journalists, were granted an interview with Massoud. During the interview one of the terrorists detonated explosives hid in a camera killing Massoud, and with him the last leader in Afghanistan capable of stopping the Taliban. It was a calculated move by bin Laden as pointed out by Bruce Riedel in *The Search for Al-Qaeda*: “This move indicates that the primary intention of [9/11] was to provoke an American invasion of Afghanistan. For bin Laden, such an invasion would recreate the scenario that had crippled the Soviet Union” (Riedel, *The Search for Al-Qaeda*, 77). By removing Massoud, bin Laden had deprived the United States of a key ally in the coming invasion.

**The United States and Pakistan**

Immediately after the attacks on 9/11 the United States presented a clear line to Pakistan in requesting its support against the Taliban. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage met with the head of the ISI, Lieutenant General Mahmoud Ahmed who happened to be visiting Washington D.C., within hours of the attacks requesting Pakistan’s support stating the matter was “black and white.” The next day the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlin met with Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf requesting the same thing with Musharraf replying “We’ll support you unstintingly” (Jones, 88).

Pakistan’s support was crucial in the United State’s initial success during Operation Enduring Freedom. Musharraf immediately evacuated the Pakistani advisors that were helping the Taliban as well as cut off all aid to the Taliban. Without Pakistan’s assistance, the Taliban was unable to maintain cohesion against the United States and the Northern Alliance which were able to capture Kabul by November 2001 and Kandahar in December 2001 (Riedel, *Deadly Embrace*, 67).

Most of the Taliban leadership, including Mullah Omar, escaped across the Pakistan border after the fall of Kandahar settling into the Baluchistan Province. Bin Laden also escaped with an estimated 1,000 al-Qaeda fighters from Afghanistan and also settled across the border into Pakistan. Pakistan’s Frontier Corps captured some of the fighters as they crossed the border turning them over to the ISI which subsequently turned them over the United States. Nonetheless, bin Laden and al-Qaeda were able to acquire sanctuary in Pakistan’s FATA. From there al-Qaeda was able to recover and regroup over the next several years safe from Pakistan and the United States military (Jones, 97-98).

**The Aftermath: Pakistan**

Fast forwarding to August 2011, Pakistan has seen a “sharp rise in militant attacks in Pakistan since May, the same month U.S. commandos killed al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden” (“Pakistan Attack”). According to Islamabad columnist Farrukh Saleem, the Taliban controls ups to 11 percent of Pakistan’s territory, while ten percent of the Balochistan province is a “no-go” area because of another insurgency, not to mention the port city of Karachi which is an “ethnic and sectarian tinderbox waiting to explode” (Rashid, “Pakistan on the Brink”). At the same time, the U.S. military finds itself continually engaged by a
resurgent Taliban forces in Afghanistan. How did the successful defeat of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in three short months drag itself out for another decade? The primary cause can be traced back to Pakistan’s role since 9/11.

In his book *Deadly Connections: State that Sponsor Terrorism*, Daniel Byman outlines three reasons state sponsor terrorism: “to advance their international political and strategic position; to further their ideology; and to bolster their position at home” (36). Those very reasons apply to Pakistan’s support of the insurgents in Kashmir as well as the Taliban in Afghanistan. By supporting both groups, Pakistan was able to effectively control its borders without having to result to direct military action. The use of proxies, in this case the Taliban and the militant Kashmir groups, Pakistan had a cost effective method way to maintain security in its country.

Initially the support of the Taliban was a logical decision for Pakistan. First it stabilized one of Pakistan’s borders with an Islamic government that would neatly align with Pakistan and against India, or as Musharraf described it: “strategic depth in Afghanistan to endure that there is a friendly regime on Pakistan’s western border” (Jones, 87). Secondly, the training camps in Afghanistan provided unmatched training to insurgents in the Kasmiri insurgency. By training in Afghanistan, “the ISI sought a measure of deniability to Indian charges that Pakistan was a state sponsor of terrorism (Riedel, *The Search of Al-Qaeda*, 65).

Given these reasons, it is understandable that Pakistan was hesitant to turn its back on the Taliban after the United States approached Pakistan for help immediately after 9/11. But by allying itself with the United States, Pakistan could gain everything it had with the Taliban and more. First is the support from the Pakistani population, “especially the urban, educated middle class – who are tired of the country’s dire economic crisis and the chronic lawlessness largely caused by Islamic extremists, and who are concerned about the rapid ‘Talibanization’ of Pakistani society (Rashid, “Pakistan, the Taliban and the U.S.,” 16).

The economic factor cannot be overstated. After 9/11, Pakistan received more than $11 billion in aid from the United States as a reward for its initial assistance as designating it as a “major non-NATO ally” of the United States which gave Pakistan priority with regards to defense cooperation and foreign aid (Rashid, “Pakistan on the Brink”). This was a major reversal from the F-16 debacle from the early 1990’s. Pakistan supported terrorism because it knew it could not compete with India on a conventional military basis, but now the United States had given it a major boost in regards to its strategic competition with India. By 2008 aid would dry up after the removal of Musharraf from office and “fairly solid evidence of [Pakistan] senior-level complicity” in supporting the Taliban (Jones, 265).

The second advantage of siding with the United States in Afghanistan was strengthening the border. Pakistan had originally sided with the Taliban in order to stabilize Afghanistan. A U.S. backed government would have achieved the same goal for Pakistan. It would still have had a major ally on its western border, allowing it to focus on India in the other direction. Where Pakistan failed itself and the United States especially was the FATA region. From the beginning Pakistan did not press into that area to deny both the Taliban and al-Qaeda sanctuary. In fact, even though the United States was proving over $1 billion annually for what was called “reimbursements” to Pakistan’s military for conducting
counterterrorism efforts in the region, the government had slashed patrols in the areas where al-Qaeda and the Taliban were most active. (Jones, 260). Where Pakistan kept minimal forces, al-Qaeda and the Taliban were able to capitalize and overwhelm the small forces fighting on unfavorable territory. Over time, both al-Qaeda and the Taliban were able to regroup and take the fight to the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2010 the Pashtuns had an estimated 50,000 jihadists inhabiting the frontier zones. In addition, over 25,000 Pakistanis were killed or injured in military-related violence, two-thirds of which occurred in the FATA and North-West Frontier Province (Riedel, *Deadly Embrace*, 93).

In essence Pakistan underestimated the major threat. By not crushing the insurgents in the FATA from the beginning, Pakistan had weakened its internal security two-fold. First the FATA became a staging area for militants who are now using the years of ISI training to conduct violence in Pakistan itself, and Pakistan has no control over the area. Though that was the original purpose of the area, “Pakistan’s strategy for external security has thus undermined its internal security” (Rubin and Rashid, 5). The United States’ frustration with the lack of action from Pakistan began drone attacks in 2007. Though Pakistan does play a role in supporting the U.S. drone attacks, they “do alienate the majority of Pakistanis” (Riedel, *Deadly Embrace*, 127). The attacks could be viewed as a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty, but most importantly it could be viewed by the Pakistan population as well as the rest of the international community as a sign of weakness; demonstrating Pakistan’s inability to ensure security within its own borders.

By supporting the United States in Afghanistan, Pakistan could have gained leverage against India as well. One of Musharraf’s first points for negotiations after 9/11 was “to pressure the Indians to resolve the Kashmir dispute in favor of Pakistan” (Jones, 89). Though the United States denied the request initially, instead of wanting to focus on the matter at hand, it was still viable leverage for Pakistan to come back to. India “took advantage of a window of opportunity to develop close ties with Hamid Karzai’s government in Afghanistan and counter Pakistan in the region” after the fall of the Taliban (Jones, 271). In addition, “India provided hundreds of millions of dollars in financial assistance to Afghanistan and sent money to Afghan political candidates during the 2004 presidential elections and 2005 parliamentary elections” (Ibid). In essence, India had created a two-front problem for Pakistan through its actions in Afghanistan. Pakistan had to deal with India in both Afghanistan and Kashmir. If Pakistan had instead gone all in with the United States instead of wavering, it could have minimized India’s presence in Afghanistan. As a show of good faith, the Pakistani government could have cracked down on the Kashmiri insurgents it supported as well, giving it even more leverage in the Kashmir dispute.

**Conclusion: The United States and Pakistan**

As much as Pakistan wavered in its support of operations in Afghanistan, the United States was just as guilty of the same thing with its attitude towards Pakistan. The United States was correct in needing Pakistan to succeed in Afghanistan. Unfortunately its answer was to throw money at Pakistan with no oversight and no direction, instead just focusing on the problem contained with Afghanistan’s borders. It turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s long
support of terrorism in order to gain Islamabad’s favor. It was a short-term necessity, but was never fully readdressed. The United States was slow in realizing that Pakistan was up to its old tricks in supporting the Taliban. It was distracted by some early successes provided by Pakistan such as the capture of Kahlid Sheikh Muhammad, one of the masterminds behind the 9/11 attack and most importantly the invasion of Iraq, which caused the United States a whole new set of headaches while at the same time providing strength to al-Qaeda’s cause.

The situation today is more dangerous than it was ten years ago. Current Pakistan President vocalizes the problem when he said “We are not a failed state yet but we may become one in ten years if we don’t receive international support to combat the Taliban threat” (Rashid, “Pakistan on the Brink”). Pakistan, a state with nuclear weapons as well as a large contingent of terrorists, poses a major security threat if it was to become a failed state. Not only in the region, but to the entire international community. The United States must realize that the current war is not just Afghanistan, but instead a Pakistan and Afghanistan together.

The United States must continue to provide military aid and assistance to Pakistan, but needs to be more directive with where it goes. The United States should ensure that it is not used to further the Kashmir conflict, but instead pushed to the other border to clamp down on the insurgents in the FATA. Pakistan has to regain control of the area and deny sanctuary to any insurgent groups contained within including the growing Pakistan Taliban. Pakistan needs this to regain control of its own security within its country. The drone attacks are an effective measure, but Pakistan needs to execute fully joint operations with the U.S. military within its borders, and out in the open. This would be a clear message to the insurgents contained within Pakistan’s borders. A stabilized Pakistan will have the same effect on Afghanistan.

At the same time, the United States has to deliver an ultimatum to Pakistan to cease all support of terrorism, both in Afghanistan and Kashmir. The United States can use its diplomatic relations with India to ease tensions in Kashmir and allow Pakistan to focus on its internal security. It can only do this though if Pakistan renounces its support for all Kashmiri insurgency groups. Pakistan also can no longer to afford to provide sanctuary to leaders such as Mullah Omar or Ayman al-Zawahari both of which are believed to be in Pakistan, which Pakistan has denied. Pakistan has already been embarrassed twice by its supposed ignorance of insurgent leaders within its borders. First is when video footage from PBS Frontline showed Taliban ally Jalaluddin Haqqani living next door to offices of the Pakistan army, and the bin Laden raid (Jones, 223).

The bin Laden killing should have served as a wakeup call to Pakistan and the United States. Both countries should realize that they cannot continue in this state of ignorance that is the affecting security of the region. Pakistan can feign anger at the violation of sovereignty, but the fact is that it should have never reached that point. Had Pakistan been unrelenting in its efforts from the beginning, al Qaeda and the Taliban would have had nowhere to go and no chance to recover. It is still not too late to create a secure border and a strong ally on its western front by cooperating with the United States fully and as Musharraf had originally stated: “unstintingly.”
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References


