Searching for Similarities between Terrorist Organizations’ Strategies

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Abstract

The underlying causes of terrorism, in concert with the stated goals of a terrorist organization, may reflect the strategy chosen in its pursuit to counter the state. The strategy any such group opted to use would be more evident in the operational patterns. The policy implications of such a study would likely reveal the ideological underpinnings of such groups, enabling states to better predict and mitigate terrorist organizations’ activities. This does presume some level of detailed analysis for any given circumstance, since terrorist organizations by nature are clandestine and are far from monolithic in their internal affairs, much less do they pursue static instructions as to how to pursue their goals.

Key words: International Terrorism; terrorist group organization, strategy and ideology

Introduction

This paper discusses how the underlying causes of terrorism combined with the stated goals of a terrorist organization may reflect the strategy such an organization will pursue. Combining this analysis with the identification of specific operational patterns exhibited by several terrorist organizations will establish the similarities between these geographically dispersed groups. In this process, suggestions are advanced that the predominant strategy employed by numerous terrorist groups is that of the popular protracted war due to the overall existence of, and importance given to, political mobilization in support of the terrorist group’s activities. There is a particular significance attached to these activities as both some segment of the populace seeks and the terrorists pursue their stated objectives, predominantly that of secession from the state in which they are found. This does not mean that such an analysis is ironclad and immune to ambiguities found in such a broad topic. Nor should it remain ignorant in identifying the effects of a transnational strategy, as amorphous as it may be, as al Qaeda seeks to influence these regional groups.
Causation

It is important to compare the goals articulated by a terrorist group against the apparent causative factors that brought about its existence. The relationship between the two would suggest the preferred strategy(s) it would employ, at least when they appear to be consistent in content.

In a hypothetical situation, a terrorist organization that articulates a goal of establishing its own state based on greater representation of its ethnic or national affiliation and is challenging the existing government based on allegations of socio-economic, political marginalization, elitist factions is practicing exclusionary policies. Based on this, such an organization may pursue a cogent strategy seeking to employ popular support to those ends. In such a case, the creation of parallel political, administrative, or social institutions by that group may be indicative of such a strategy.

Instructive to this is the formulaic calculation of those preconditions that appear to lend themselves to the rise of insurgent and terrorist organizations as an expression of rejection of the existing political system within a state. It takes into account some of the same socioeconomic, political, geo-strategic, ideological, and psychological factors that other arguments rely upon without the pitfalls inherent to those arguments. Rather it takes into some account the situations surrounding specific developments that appear to foster the ascendancy of terrorist groups. From this assessment the formulaic model derived is $t = f(e, p, h, si, t_{t-1})$. In this formula, $t$ equates to the existence of one or more terrorist groups as precipitated by a number of interrelated factors $(f)$ such as, $(e)$ the economic performance of a state as reflected by its unemployment rate, uneven growth of sectors of the economy, and inflation that its populace must negotiate in the course of its daily activities. Although debated by various authors, it will be instructive to keep in mind how a state’s economic performance does play a role in some terrorist groups’ goals and strategies. In a similar vein, $(p)$ represents the structure of a state’s economy as it pertains to the level of economic inequality and social injustice suffered by segments of that society as represented by the level of repression or abuse the central government levies against segments of its populace, as reflected by allegations of human rights abuses represented by $(h)$. The nature of the state’s political system is also a factor in this equation and is represented by $(si)$. In this, those states that possess a level of representation that is neither fully autocratic nor fully democratic may be prone to instability and the emergence of terrorism within some segment of the populace. Finally, the incidence of previous terrorist organizations and the existence of a clandestine infrastructure that would support subsequent terrorist organizations are represented by $(t_{t-1})$. This would suggest a predisposition of a population segment towards fostering recurrent rebellious organizations (Feldmann and Perala, 2004).

But consistency between causation and the stated goals of a terrorist organization is not certain. This idealistic situation is devoid of the ambiguity that is characteristic of most such scenarios, but does lend itself as one template by which one can measure these relationships in specific case studies. Those problems encountered in assessing insurgent strategies involve, at the most superficial level, the fact that terrorist organizations are by nature clandestine, but public in effect. More specifically, terrorists may publicly bring attention to any number of reasons for their calculated employment of violence or the threat of violence to the attention of their audiences. But, they are much less willing to articulate a clear and concise strategic plan as to how they intend to pursue their goals and objectives. This is in part to avoid the instruments of state power that are being used to defeat or constrain them. It may also be reflective of ill
defined, ambiguous or poorly articulated goals within the group. Additionally, this presumes that those goals and objectives do not mutate, or are discarded, over time and that they are effected by the actions of a state or states. Finally, this also suggests that terrorists, like governments, are monolithic in their view of both their situation and the desired outcomes of their actions (O’Neill, 2005).

For the absence of a better conceptual model, this article will continue to apply the \( t = f(e, p, h, si, t_{t-1}) \) formula in conjunction with a brief review of the strategies that a terrorist organization can model its operations against. Through a process of elimination, the most probable strategy will come to light. This will be most evident in the review of specific case studies that will highlight those common causes, operational patterns and strategies being employed today by terrorist organizations.

**Strategies**

A conspiratorial strategy is one that advocates for the brief and violent use of force to remove a government from power in order to change policy or a system that is seen as being illegitimate. For this to be present as a common strategy employed by terrorists today, small elitist cadres attempting to rapidly change the form of governments by means of violence would have to be identified as a commonality among them. The urban warfare strategy seeks to alienate the government from the populace through provocation of the government into increasingly harsh or reactionary acts that culminate in the populace rebelling against the government. It is centered on urban centers and the preponderance of the population that is found there. For this to be the commonality among terrorist groups, popular rebellions subsequent to acts of state repression or over-reaction would have similarity across geographic boundaries. As will be demonstrated in the selected vignettes, neither strategy is apparent.

From this process there remain only two or three strategies from which one may determine any consistent pattern between geographically disperse terrorist organizations. The military focus strategy anticipates a long period of violence directed against the government, but posits that no mobilization of the populace is necessary, as its support is either a foregone conclusion or that popular support pre-exists or is latent, awaiting expression triggered by success. Although a possibility, this strategy appears to lack substantiation given the presence of numerous, although contradictory at times, political groups and agendas at work in these vignettes.

A popular protracted warfare strategy is based on the precept that the support of the rural population, as the majority, would be required in order to overthrow or change the government. This strategy presupposes three sub states through which a revolution would pass. Common to all three is the emphasis on social mobilization and engagement in order to establish a political base for the revolution. Whether groups are weak and only maintain the most ‘grass root’ level of political organization as found in the strategic defense executive; the existence of a ‘shadow’ administration which parallels the internationally recognized one as found in the strategic defense executive; or whether that de facto parallel government is sufficiently capable of providing for the services which the failing government can no longer provide, as is the case with the strategic offensive stage of development, they all represent a heavy reliance on political organization(s) counter from that recognized by the extant government.

Finally the transnational strategy, as it employs a variety of methodologies such as economic, diplomatic, and information operational tactics, may be influential because of its
ability to lend credibility and provide support to a variety of regional terrorist groups. It focuses on a growing anti-Western, anti-globalization sentiment that is common to many marginalized and repressed ethnic and religious groups in the world. Although it may not be a common strategy employed today by terrorist groups, its appeal is growing as a significant challenger to the power states (O'Neill, 2005).

Case Studies

Given the rapid changes brought on by decolonization and globalization, African youth have moved from being predominantly rural poor and marginal political figures to key players in the economy and politics in city centers through the practice of violence and illicit activities. In this, youths seek to rebel against mismanagement by the state, which is often embodied in one strong personality, one who exhibits arbitrary governance.

Politics of such state governance drives rebellion, especially when the state’s funding dries up and those dependent on that funding are left without recourse. This drives these marginalized populations to seek alternative means to sustain themselves, as they turn to resource extraction and the powerful ‘owners’ of such enterprises, warlords in many cases. This informal economy provides for them when the state became unable (Boas, 2004).

Such is the case of Somalia where the government dissolved in 1991 leaving behind numerous disparate tribal, clan, and sub-clan warlords vying for power and control over scarce resources. It continues to have ties to terrorism, specifically al Qaeda. Given it possesses neither an effective government to control its borders, nor perform any administrative function, or to provide any meaningful economic program for any segment of the former state, it remains the epitome of a ‘failed’ state. This condition is perhaps the most conducive to terrorist groups, given the sanctuary that it provides. In another variation, an Islamic majority, who holds the political, military, and economic advantage at the expense of Christian and Animist segments of the state, governs Sudan from the north. It faces the impact of a growing secessionist movement in the south, where the majority of Sudan’s oil reserves reside. The outbreak of a civil war would not be out of the realm of possibility, given the conditions there. And Sudan has historical ties to terrorism, specifically al Qaeda as well (Morrison, 2002).

In the case of Nigeria, a key trading partner of the US, it possesses oil reserves important to the latter’s economy. It also has the second largest Muslim population, next to Egypt. Its Muslim population in the north is much more empathetic to the Middle East and West African Muslims than the Christian South. Nigeria is showing signs of radicalization since democracy instituted; as the new regime took shape and democratic institutions formed, all gains were at the expense of the North’s influence. A corresponding challenge to the central government arose when one of 36 governors introduced Shari’a law to that administrative region. Since then, eleven more governors now have adopted Shari’a law as well. Compounding this, Nigeria uses its army to keep the order, and there were allegations of human rights abuses. Concurrently Nigeria’s economy has declined, with its GDP slowing 20% off its height, further aggravating the situation.

Outside of Nigeria the threat of an increasing presence of terrorist organizations may be based on lack of sovereign control and inability in general to effectively govern remote regions in West and Central Africa where there are indications of partnerships arising between criminal organizations and terrorist organizations. One explanation is that al Qaeda seeks to expand its financial base in the region through illicit means such as the case of marketing ‘blood diamonds’
from Sierra Leone (prior to the implementation of the Kimberly Process by the international community). In South Africa, the social movement People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) arose to combat crime, but was apparently hijacked by extremist elements. PAGAD is now implicated in a variety of terrorist attacks to include nightclub bombings, threats made to the US consul general, as well as allegations of Saudi financed Imams’ who staged a demonstration against the US and Israeli embassies (Lyman and Morrison, 2005).

The situation in Kashmir, as elsewhere, reflects the costs South Asia incurred on a post-colonial population that was left to its own devices rather than with an established viable state with functioning institutions and a tradition of self-rule. Kashmiris want self-determination, but don't know which state’s claims to their territory as being beneficial to those ambitions. On one hand Pakistan prefers to resolve this discussion based on a 1948 UN Resolution where Kashmir must choose between it and India. On the other, India prefers the 1971 Simla Agreement where it and Pakistan must solve the problem of Kashmir between them (Oberoi, 2001).

Although both Hindu and Muslims have peacefully coexisted in this region, coexistence has not equated to cultural fusion. More specifically, both Kashmir and Jammu states are in Indian territory today. Although they both reflect a dominantly Muslim population, there are Hindu and Ladakh Buddhist (Tibetan ties through culture and ethnicity) in Jammu, while Free Kashmir is predominantly Pakistani. This natural division is further complicated by religious-ethnic calls, economic distinctions, and tensions between urban and village populations that are fomented by both India and Pakistan. Further aggravating this is the attraction by some to the vein of fanatical Islam that is undergoing revitalization today (Oberoi, 2001; Blank, 1999).

Within Kashmir a limited autonomy without independence has existed for 40 years. Bilateral talks between India and Pakistan (1972) resolved nothing in terms of the choice facing the Kashmiris, and in 1989, an insurgency rose in response to a series of rigged elections that caused the Kashmiris to feel they were sold out to India (Blank, 1999).

Over time the polarization and marginalization between segments of the population continued to grow. But the significant tipping point was met with an influx of Pakistani irregulars who follow pan-Islamic fundamentalism rather than Kashmiri nationalism. They are bolstered by the Pakistani ISI and therefore are not beholden to Pakistani civilian officials. At that point Kashmir turned to India to defend it, and India responded with military forces, driving the Pakistani irregulars out of Kashmir. But the foreign militants trained and experienced in Afghanistan and Pakistan gave new impetus behind the Muslim insurgency. Their popularity was greater in rural poor areas as compared to those wealthy urban city populations, as they target Hindus foremost, but did not exclude from attack those notionally supportive Muslims either. Yet, they were unsuccessful against the Indians’ use of counter-insurgency operations, even though these have been far from successful themselves. This is because Indian security officials were brought in from other parts of the country, had no connection with the local populace, and saw no distinction between Muslims in general and terrorists. Although the incidences of beatings, torture, and custodial killings have ebbed in Kashmir, there was a corresponding increase in Jammu. This does not mean to suggest that the local village defense forces are any less guilty of the same crimes (Oberoi, 2001; Blank, 1999).

In the end, neither of the local populations identify fully with the paramilitary forces amongst them, nor have they opted for either India or Pakistan. The militants were unsuccessful in forcing India to withdraw its forces and negotiate away some segment of the Kashmir to Pakistan. Conversely, India views the local population as being supporters of these same militants and refuses to relinquish its protection from the area. And Pakistan has failed to
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persuade a decision in their favor either. Tellingly, the return to dialog by the Pakistan government with the Indian, and discussions of allowing the Kashmiris to decide their own fate in a non-polluted atmosphere is predominantly a call for a return to pre-1989 conditions. The exception now is of the bloodshed and violence that has occurred there since that time (Oberoi, 2001). But this ignores the divided population that has little or no faith in the state, the promise of elections, or any directed solutions from either government (Blank, 1999).

In Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) defend their actions based on their social history, traditions, culture, and language being justification for their pursuit of self-determination for their own homeland. They too are a post-colonial amalgam based on previous British rule, one that practiced control through the granting of privilege to one segment of the population over another. In post-colonial rule, the distribution of power was reversed, and the Sinhalese became the politically empowered ethnicity. Taken from the Tamil perspective, they practiced reverse discrimination or oppression through legislation. Examples cited include the use of the Sinhalese language instead of English as the official language, and admissions to higher education were altered to favor the Sinhalese. In the economy, the government attempted to curb investment in Tamil areas and lucrative jobs in the security forces were restricted from Tamil applicants. Allegations of human rights abuses and atrocities have been purported to be performed by those same security forces (The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam).

These claims made by the Tamil are based upon the "Sinhala Only" slogan of Sinhalese Prime Minister Bandaranaike in 1956. But even this apparently discriminatory slogan was further embellished by forces within his party who further radicalized this sentiment against the Tamils, resulting in the Tamil separatist movement. These Sinhalese politicians played off of the chauvinism in their community at opportune times to undermine Tamil representation in government or settle their differences with the Tamil. Due to this, communal riots until 1983 and subsequent disenfranchisement of Tamil youth with existing political leaders sought (and succeeded) to raise militancy of Tamil political agenda. This was originally expressed as civil disobedience, arson, bombings, and assassination focused on forcing established Tamil politicians out of power (Di Silva, 1999).

As the violence expressed by the Tamils grew and set upon the Sinhalese government, Sri Lanka pursued and won a peace accord with India in July 1987 that brought the Indian military to the island to secure the peace in the Tamil stronghold of northeastern Sri Lanka. But this failed to engage the LTTE and did not recognize that it had exerted both political and administrative control of the Jaffna Peninsula previously. Meanwhile, the Tamils enjoyed sanctuary across the straits on mainland India. This sanctuary in all practicality made India complicit in the Tamil insurgency as it provided arms, training, and other supplies to India. This was all in an attempt to placate Tamils in India so they would not rise against the Indian government (Pfaffenberger, 1988; Di Silva, 1999).

But, the Sri Lankan Tamils upset their mainland cousins with incriminations of their involvement in drug trafficking, assassination, robberies, and bombings. So their support waned. Compounding this, the LTTE resorted to a program of violent repression of their political opponents and using civilians as screens to shield themselves from Sri Lankan government forces in order to affect their escape. As Sri Lankan government forces progressed to LTTE camps and victory was all but assured, the Indian government resupplied the LTTE to counter its imminent downfall.

Upon subsequent political negotiations Indian forces intervened in the Tamil administrative areas in order to affect a Sri Lankan withdrawal and a government referendum on
unification. This allowed the government to focus on a growing preservationist insurgency in the south of the island. Overall Sri Lankan youth saw democracy as a plaything of the politically corrupt, subject to their scheming, subterfuges, and short-term expediencies rather than any long-term resolution of their issues (Pfaffenberger, 1988). Prior to its withdrawal, India established a more moderate political party, Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front, who won control of the provincial council in the North in an election that the LTTE boycotted. Instead the Tamils have signaled that they may relinquish their goal of a sovereign state if a negotiated resolution of the conflict and its underlying causes can be agreed upon (Pfaffenberger, 1988; De Silva, 1999).

Jemaah Islamiyah’s (JI) history stretches back to the 1960s as they considered themselves the ideological heirs to anti-Dutch Muslim guerrillas in the 1940s. They seek to institute Shari'a law in southeast Asia, and through the establishment of boarding schools (pesantrens) taught from Islam, through their Wahhabist lens. They sent volunteers to Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight the Soviet Union alongside their Muslim brothers in arms. In so doing they trained in the same camps there as other Islamists. This history of cooperation and coordination with al Qaeda extends further back into history than many other groups globally. But locally, those groups were, for the most part, constrained by their government. The fall of the Suharto government in Indonesia (1998) relaxed those constraints against its Muslim minority. As the liberalization of those regimes progressed from autocracy to anocracy, the weak central government was unable to counter the effects of its moderate Muslim population becoming radicalized after the regional economic downturn. Furthering this radicalization process was the anti-US backlash associated with the war in Iraq, as US policies were seen to emphasize the application of hard power (seek and destroy missions) versus soft power of inclusion (winning hearts and minds). As the local governments faced increasing social opposition, close alliance with the US Administration and its policies became a concern, as both Muslim radicals and secular nationalists were displeased with its implications to their causes. During this period, Muslim - Christian tensions erupted into violence resulting in increasing civilian casualties, which in turn created more opportunities for Muslims to recruit, train, and fund local fighters. Although JI may be more regionally focused, with the expressed interest to radicalize the Muslims in the area, there are instances of broader coalitions forming between it and similar groups. One such example is its relationship with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) with whom it has shared training and conducted joint operations in the region. Although they have conducted local attacks against select targets, they did seek out western interests in the region, which defines some common interests with the broader transnational agenda represented by al Qaeda.

The elections in 2004 resulted in the ascendancy of former military General and Security Minister Yudhoyono rise to power. His policy focus was on strengthening his regime institutions in order to address those underlying causes for terrorism through economic and social change. He was also successful in the capture of the top two militant leaders, further constraining their cause both in terms of eliminating their leadership, as well as providing visible examples that the state was capable of defending itself (Vaughn et al, 2005; Abuza, 2004).

Conclusion

In the preceding vignettes, a general pattern of terrorist operational activities emerges as these groups pursue their select strategy(s) in order to accomplish their ultimate goals and objectives. Clear patterns emerge based on a clear understanding of both their motivations (causes of, and goals in pursuing terrorism) and the strategies available to them.
In general, polarization between ethno-religious groups based on secessionist goals of one segment of a population in response to a variety of real or perceived inequities is common in these examples. In many instances this is compounded by a lack of trust in the existing political institutions and leaders by an increasingly impatient and politically motivated youth. Much of this impatience is centered on the apparent lack of change through the state’s weak institutions that are responsible for the political life of the state. This does not mean to exclude those economic and other related institutions, but focuses this dissatisfaction on the political institutions as key to this process. This dissatisfaction is only exacerbated by the government’s inability or unwillingness to engage with this segment of the population in order to resolve the emerging conflict early in its development. Instead, the government ignores or even attempts to repress this expression of dissatisfaction, resulting in allegations of human rights abuses, among other symptoms. This only fuels a greater desire for secession in this marginalized and under-represented segment(s) of society, as secessionism is seen as the only option available for the group to alleviate the injustices it feels is levied against it. This results in a “balkanization” of ethnic and religious groups as the secessionist movement takes on momentum and resorts to some degree of violence. Further complicating this pattern is the very real possibility that these secessionist movements are then further radicalized or even hijacked by militants or ideologues. As this takes form, the propensity to resort to terrorism increases, especially in the face of the state’s use of military and security forces in order to repress or dismantle the movement. By this time, the movement loses most of the faith placed in the existing government, and further terrorist acts become key to combating the government. In several examples, state on state tensions rise, fueling the use of these factions as surrogates to resolve long unresolved claims or issues between them.

Taking the formula \( t = f(e, p, h, s_i, t_{t-1}) \) and highlighting recurrent themes, \((h), (s_i)\) and \((t_{t-1})\) all come to the fore. As human rights violations \((h)\) apparently worsen, the likelihood of terrorist organizations’ activity increases. When the state’s political system and institutions \((s_i)\) are weak, terrorist activity is also likely to occur. Whether or not, as Feldman and Perala suggest, there is a greater likelihood of increased terrorist activity after this situation improves remains uncertain from the perspective of those marginalized from the political life. Perhaps in those cases where greater autocratic (and repressive) governments arise, such conditions may be the case. There does seem to be truth to the matter that previous terrorist or insurgent activity \((t_{t-1})\) predicates the subsequent likelihood of further terrorist activity in a state as well. Whether this is because of the possibility of such organizations following a cyclical pattern of activity then “going to ground” or there is a contagion effect is less well understood (Feldmann and Perala, 2004).

The key question to determining which strategy is most often being pursued by various terrorist groups irrespective of geography is whether or not parallel institutions are being established by the social movement that sustains them. As these descriptions indicate, there is a propensity of evidence that suggests that there are. To some degree political, social, and even economic institutions were formed to meet the needs of the local populace, even though they are geographically spanning well over half the earth’s surface. Given their existence, it would be suggestive that the popular protracted warfare strategy is the most common strategy employed by terrorist and insurgent groups. But given government responses to the local threats posed by groups following this strategy, a strong case can be made that they have suffered setbacks from their incipient formation and growth (e.g. “Strategic Defense” and “Strategic Stalemate”, respectively) to remain at a stalemate, at best. If not for the reliance on parallel institutions that
convey some political legitimacy for terrorist groups, and given a dominance upon a purely force on force combat capability, a case for the military focus strategy could be made.

Further complicating this assessment is the impact of those efforts by the transnational strategy, as best exemplified by al Qaeda, clouding a clear determination. But it is apparent that, in many instances, local or regional insurgencies and their terrorist groups are seeking or have been sought out by al Qaeda in order to gain access to resources (e.g. training, finance, propaganda, legitimacy, to name a few) that the terrorist group would be unable to possess by themselves.

Therefore most cases of insurgencies utilizing terrorist tactics are those pursuing a popular protracted warfare strategy in the strategic stalemate stage of development, with some degree of transnational insurgent strategy being either implemented (e.g. JI, MILF, ASG in Southeast Asia) or being hijacked by Islamic fundamentalists (e.g. Kashmir, South Africa) (Vaughn et al, 2005; Kurlantzick, 2001). The latter influence may be an indication of either the much-touted expansion of al Qaeda or an attempt by it to assist these regional organizations progress to the strategic offensive stage of the popular protracted war, or both.

Implications and Policy Recommendations

There are numerous policy implications based on such a broad characterization of what strategy is being employed by insurgencies globally. Although such a broad stroke assessment is relatively easy to determine, providing a similarly broad solution is fraught with pitfalls, as the local circumstances will require detailed study and analysis for truly effective solutions to be developed. In the end, each movement is individual in the particular tactical choices being made by its members, but some suggested starting points may be inferred based on this discussion. If correct that a popular protracted warfare strategy is being employed either alone or in concert with some influence of a transnational strategy, there then may be some immediate actions that states may employ to counteract them. One highly visible indicator as to whether this is the case, as well as a critical vulnerability to such a strategy, is the presence of parallel institutions. Although intended to provide the populace a more responsive and tangible presence of governance, these can be challenged or even co-opted by the state. Some mechanisms available to the state to pursue either tactical choice include; the use of judicial (legalizing or outlawing an institution and its activities), legislative (creating or modifying existing state institutions to perform more effectively), or political means (cooption or negotiation of key figures) in order to mitigate or render ineffective such parallel institutions. In the cases mentioned, the simple matter of providing the populace access to an effective government would have prevented some of the outcomes we see today. Given the influence of a transnational strategy in these matters, it stands to reason that multilateral acts on the part of a number of states would also help mitigate its effects on an insurgency or terrorist organization. Simply the precept would be to turn the insurgent groups' strengths into their most critical vulnerabilities.

From the outset, it must be reiterated that specific circumstances will determine unique challenges and opportunities as to how a state may mitigate a terrorist organization's strategy(s). There exists no simple template that will apply to each set of circumstances, but there are broad stroke factors that should be considered prior to and during any counterterrorism policy debate that will have the potential to effect the operations of both government and terrorist groups. Returning to the Feldman and Perala formula \[ f(e, p, h, si, t_{-1}) \] lends a specificity that the O'Neill analytical framework omits. What O'Neill does lend to this analysis is the reminder that
each causative factor cited by Feldman and Perala may have both a domestic or an external support component, and that this level of support spans from relatively benign moral support of an organization's activities through to the overt granting of sanctuary that presumes political and material support. O'Neill also echoes that geography does play a factor in the struggle between government and terrorist organization; and is manifest in the way the international system works. Ignoring the significance of geography, as was common during the colonial era, has resulted in numerous artificial boundaries that perpetuate to this day several on-going conflicts between states and terrorist or insurgent groups (e.g. Africa - Algeria, Tunisia, Libya; and South Asia - Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Bangladesh; etc.). The geography of a nationality is also indicative of its ability to access and exploit resources or their derivatives (e.g. mineral deposits and oil for income; water and arable land for foodstuffs). Due to this, states will have to determine whether to pursue a unilateral or multilateral approach in mitigating a terrorist organization, especially when confronting those organizations that are pursuing secession in an attempt to create a new state. Because of the international system, it is likely that more than one state will have an interest in the maintenance of the existing boundaries in the effected area, so multilateralism would be suggestive of a successful approach.

As much as geography plays a role in the economy of a state, given the effects of globalization, other elements afford a state's populace with economic opportunity. The economic features of a state are also key points that either the state or the international community may leverage in order to mitigate or minimize terrorist groups' support structure. Efforts to broaden and stimulate economic activity in terms of broader employment opportunities and create new economic sectors while curbing or reversing inflationary pressures are tangible measures that can be employed to counter opposition movements. This may require multilateral efforts that would include some mix of foreign direct investment, granting of low interest loans, loan forbearance, or even debt relief in some instances. Coupling these economic stimulus efforts with those that seek to address the inequalities and social injustices often brought about by weak government institutions, institutional reform may contribute to mitigating terrorism and insurgencies in the world. Although numerous criticisms (some warranted) were levied against organizations such as the World Bank, its efforts to both provide for economic stimuli as well as demanding institutional reform within states plagued with economic fragility, is a method that cannot be discounted.

Key to much of what occurs in a state is the form and manner by which governance is exercised. It often plays a critical role in the formation and perpetuation of an insurgent or terrorist movement. Those states that have ineffective political institutions (whether by accident or by design) lead to the marginalization of some segment of its populace from the political process. Correcting this is just one possible means to mitigate the influence of terrorist movements in societies. Although those institutional improvements wrought through the promotion of liberal democracies appear to be one means to these ends, the matter appears to be more complex than mere ideology. It appears that long-term investment in a state's democratic processes and institutions is necessary in order to ensure its stability; otherwise these weak democracies (anocracies) will continue to spawn insurgent and terrorist movements. The alternative is the acceptance of more autocratic governments in the world system (Goldstone et al, 2005). Tied to the political system of a state, the level of repression or allegations of human rights abuses employed or enabled by the central government and levied against segments of its population. This may be through acts of omission (e.g. Janajweed in Sudan) as well as acts of commission (e.g. Rwanda) that are frequently brought to light only through successive attempts
and calls for action by those states that are stable enough themselves to commit resources to such efforts. International approbation can be pursued unilaterally, but those instances of success appear to be those taken through multilateral means (e.g. United Nations). Although this role is relatively new, and there have been policy complications (e.g. UN action in Bosnia, Rwanda, Sudan to name a few), it is an avenue that has yet to be fully explored, much less matured into the full extent to which it may provide some measure of success in countering insurgencies and terrorism.

Addressing the propensity of a state to foster successive insurgent or terrorist organizations suggests that there are countermeasures to existing clandestine infrastructure that perpetuates over time and conditions that would support successive challenges to the state. In many cases, various institutional changes inhibiting such networks from further growth or influence may include more restrictive measures on the part of the ailing state as well as its effected neighbors. Some of these changes may include tighter government controls on the issuance of passports and supporting documentation to standards that the international community develops and more effective border controls. Greater scrutiny must be given to visa issuance as well as the emplacement of a normative standard as to what constitutes a valid visa regime that facilitates travel, but prevents freedom of movement of terrorists and their support network. In this case, both primary documentation (birth certificates, domestic identity papers) as well as secondary documents (passports and visas) would be less susceptible to forgery or theft of blank forms. More frequent and thorough cargo inspection regimes by customs officials in order to intercept material aid given to insurgent or terrorist groups would contribute to a counterterrorist program. Additionally, the pursuit of an international financial and banking regime that facilitates the flow of funds between states and enterprises, individuals (through remittances), and nongovernmental organizations, while inhibiting the support given to terrorist or insurgent groups, would constrain them as well. Contributing to these predominantly law enforcement efforts, are those issues surrounding those criminal enterprises that conduct illicit transactions that an insurgency or terrorist movement would seek out in order to meet their own needs (e.g. profit making, arms and material supplies, and human smuggling).

Summary

In summation, it should be evident that there are numerous options available to states today to pursue a counterterrorist strategy should they opt to do so. But it will take political will in the form of dedicated commitment over time and the expenditure of not inconsequential resources to do so. Patience and diplomacy will be necessary on the part of those states that seek to constrain and mitigate insurgent or terrorist violence through multilateral efforts. The proper characterization of the causative factors that led to the rise of insurgencies and terrorist movements is one significant, although difficult method, by which to derive effective countermeasures.
References