New Tactical Objectives for Terrorist Groups in Somalia and Yemen

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Abstract

The phenomenon of terrorism is not new. For centuries groups have sought political change through the use of violence and intimidation against a civilian population. Much like the society it exists in, the method of terrorism continues to change. One of the more recent developments is the spread of homegrown, self-radicalized terrorist operatives in Western nations. Groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have led the pack in promoting these internal threats. The new tactical objective of encouraging self-radicalization of Western citizens carries significant implications for counter-terrorism policies. Evans (2005) provides an outstanding piece regarding the tactical objectives of terror organizations. This research will begin by reviewing Evans’ (2005) piece and developing a useful framework to apply to the efforts of Al-Shabaab and AQAP. Next, a brief historical background of the two groups will be provided to illustrate the driving forces behind these two groups. Having established a framework for analysis and historical context, this paper will contrast Evans’ (2005) piece with the current efforts by Al-Shabaab and AQAP to encourage radicalization and subsequent attacks by citizens of Western governments. Finally, policy implications of the self-radicalization movement will be illustrated. In sum, this article will seek to prove that efforts to promote self radicalization of Western citizens represent a new tactical objective of terror organizations that demands a coordinated government response.

Key Words: Terrorism, Self-Radicalization, Al-Shabaab, AQAP

Introduction

The phenomenon of terrorism is not new. For centuries groups have sought political change through the use of violence and intimidation against a civilian population. Much like the world it exists in, the threat of terrorism has undergone several evolutionary steps. One of the most important came at the end of the Cold War. From the end of World War Two until the fall of the Soviet Union terrorism reemerged on the world stage and grew quickly in notoriety. During the 1970s and 1980s the method was largely characterized by leftist groups pursuing separatist and ideologically led campaigns. Groups like the Red Army Faction, Italian Red
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Brigades, and the Irish Republican Army were primarily motivated by secular concerns including self determination and a desire to see Marx’s worker revolution finally come to fruition. These groups executed operations on the tactical and strategic levels that were tailor made. However, the fall of the Berlin Wall marked an important change in the realm of terrorism. The gaze of the international community was now focused on a new threat.

Brewing in the background of terrorism’s new found publicity was the growth of religious fanaticism. The manner in which these types of terror groups operate is very different from their predecessors. This paper seeks to analyze these differences. An exhaustive review of the motivations of every religiously based terror groups is outside the scope of this paper; instead it will focus on two organizations that are on the cutting edge of the method of terrorism. Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) operate in ways that are fundamentally different from the secular organizations of the past.

The analysis of this threat will be divided into three parts. This paper will begin by establishing a framework for the evaluation terrorism’s tactical objectives. Evans (2005) will provide a useful construct which illustrates the aims of terrorist organizations. Once the framework is established, a brief introduction will be provided to highlight the background of the two organizations of interest. Understanding their evolution and operating environments is an essential element of their unique nature. The second part of the paper will be devoted to illustrating the differences in the tactical objectives laid out by Evans (2005), and those which are pursued by Al Shabaab and AQAP. Finally, this piece will conclude by offering several important policy recommendations to combat the enemy’s evolving tactics. The danger posed by these two groups, particularly from their focus on encouraging self-radicalization among westerners, is certainly one of the most pressing issues facing the international community. This paper will show that this new threat is real, unique, and demands a comprehensive approach on the part of policymakers.

In order to show just how different AQAP and Al Shabaab’s playbook is, one must first establish a field of play. Evans (2005) provides important insight into the tactical objectives of terror organizations. Leveraging decades’ worth of experience in the counter-terrorism field, Evans (2005) posits five distinct objectives pursued by terror groups. Before reviewing these objectives though, it is important to differentiate between strategic and tactical levels. The grand diatribes of Al Qaeda and other fanatical organizations leadership state the goals include the common themes of removing the west’s troops from the Middle East, destroying Israel, and establishing an ninth century Caliphate fall into the realm of strategic objectives. These are the overarching organizational goals that serve more as inspiration than marching orders for rank and file zealots.

On the other hand, tactical goals are much more pragmatic. They provide an important answer to the question of the purpose behind each attack. A single suicide bombing or rocket attack will surely not spell the end of Israel, so what does it accomplish? Tactical objectives can also serve to guide counter-terrorism policymakers towards a strong strategy. For each of the tactical objectives mentioned below, consider also the countering point of view for the counter-terrorism community. For Evans (2005), an attack is launched to pursue several tactical objectives. The first is to garner publicity. The author cites the 1972 Munich Olympic incident as an example of this objective. The terrorists involved were keenly aware the extraordinary level of publicity that would be achieved when their operation was put in motion. Second, Evans
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(2005) argues that organizations will seek to impart a strategic cost on their opponents. Terrorists are cognizant of the economic losses inflicted upon the society surrounding their targets. The third tactical objective offered by Evans (2005) is the terrorist’s desire to spur an overreaction by the government that they are opposed to. The author highlights Irish Republican Army (IRA) attacks that served to incite the British forces to overreact in a manner that only served to push more recruits towards the terrorists. Fourth, terror groups seek to polarize societies. Evans (2005) argues that this tactical goal is pursued vigorously by Palestinian terror groups in their struggle with Israel. He states that “every time there is any hint of a compromise settlement, there will quickly be a spectacular bombing” (Evans, 2005, 176) to push the two sides back apart. The final tactical goal that Evans (2005) identifies is the pursuit of material benefit. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’s (FARC) kidnappings for ransom and narcotics trafficking are solid examples of a terror organization’s efforts to acquire wealth.

In sum, Evans’ (2005) framework regarding the tactical objectives of terrorists is very important. To counter the threat posed by Al Shabaab and AQAP, policymakers must know how to protect civilians and infrastructure that could serve as a target to a terror group’s pursuit of the above mentioned goals. Also, they must be aware of the terrorist’s desire for publicity and overreaction. Evans’ (2005) piece does a remarkable job of characterizing the tactical objectives of secular terror groups of the Cold War, and even several modern religiously based terror organizations. However, there are a few crucial differences with the threat emerging from the Horn of Africa. These differences will be touched upon later in this paper. First, a brief introduction needs to be offered regarding the terror groups of Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

After earning its independence in 1960, Somalia has been the epicenter of violence within the Horn of Africa region. From 1950 to 1978 the nation repeatedly fought wars over territory with its neighbors. The conflicts with Ethiopia and Kenya took a terrible toll on the poor nation that was still recovering from its role in World War Two. In 1969 General Siad Barre took power in Somalia during a coup and he began searching for a patron super power during the Cold War. The General first sought and received arms and a treaty of friendship from the Soviet Union. However, Somalia’s instigation of another conflict with Ethiopia forced a rapid reversal on the part of the Soviets. The USSR quickly backed the Ethiopians with massive shipments of arms and Cuban military advisors. The change in the balance of forces quickly calmed the violence as Somalia was now clearly outnumbered and outgunned. Following the conflict and the abandonment by the Soviets, Barre quickly turned to the West and was able to establish a relationship with the United States (Countrywatch, 2011).

The partnership blossomed during the 1980s, but signs of trouble were appearing on the Somali horizon. Barre increasingly solved his political problems through the use of brutal military action. The economy collapsed due to ever increasing levels of violence. In 1990 the government of Somalia ceased to exist in any significant manner (Countrywatch, 2011). The Army fractured into groups controlled by tribal warlords and the nation as a whole descended into a morass that it has never recovered from.

Somalia became the poster child of failed states. The nation is not controlled by a central government; rather it is run by numerous local polities who constantly compete for influence. Repeated attempts by the United Nations to provide humanitarian aid and support for the development of a central government have all failed. Most notably of course was the UN famine
relief effort that resulted in the infamous battle of Mogadishu and the subsequent rapid removal of international peacekeeping forces. Menkhaus (1995) suggests that in Somalia, “Politically, statelessness still has a constituency, including those who profit from an economy of plunder…” (p. 2). The legitimate economic realm also offers little hope of spurring a stronger central government. Menkhaus (1995) argues that clan politics have dominated Somalia’s commercial activity. The country’s early drift towards Islamic radicalization is evident in Menkhaus’ 1995 piece in which he states that “…with the withdrawal of UNOSOM forces, a new system of policing and judging crimes is emerging…namely, the Islamic Courts” (p. 4). Mosques were built at an increasing pace and they quickly filled a judicial void through the enforcement of Shari’a law.

Beginning in the Medina neighborhood of Northern Mogadishu, the Islamic Courts Union quickly sought to expand its influence through the spread of its brand of Islam. It established bonds with the terror organization known as al-Ittihad. This move boosted the Court’s gravitas because of al-Ittihad’s participation in the Afghan resistance during the 1980s occupation (Mantzikos, 2008). As the Islamic Court’s influence grew during the 1990s and early 2000s, splits within the Union began to appear. Most notably was the growing divide between the Court’s Sufi sect which did not support global Jihad, and the more radical al-Ittihad group with its militant wing known as Al Shabaab. The wing, whose name translates in English to “the youth”, was nearly eliminated by the Ethiopian Army in 2006. After that conflict, Al Shabaab reconstituted and began to raise money and new recruits as an opposition force to the Ethiopian Occupation (Economist, 2010). Today the organization controls most of Mogadishu and all of southern Somalia.

Having introduced Al Shabaab, this paper will now turn to its geographical neighbor, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Much like Somalia, Yemen has played host to sectarian and tribal violence for most of its history. Since its independence in 1967, the nation has struggled through communism, unification, and the meddling of regional powers. In 1994 the unification agreement finally broke down and a brutal civil war ensued. Eventually the Saleh regime was able to pacify the resistance and it began to reassert its influence in most areas of the country (Countrywatch, 2011). Today, Yemen’s political situation is as untenable as ever. Secessionist movements in the south, a decades’ old Shia rebellion in the north, and pro-democracy protesters in the streets of Sana’a are all pulling in different directions. A new level of insecurity was reached in July 2011 when President Ali Abdullah Saleh suffered severe burns over 40 percent of his body during an attack on his residence. The leader has remained in Saudi Arabia after receiving medical treatment and his return to Yemen is hardly assured.

Yemen is also rolling down the trail towards state failure for two other reasons in addition to its political instability. First, food insecurity is at an all time high. The World Food Program reports that 96 percent of Yemeni households are net buyers of food in a country with very little domestic agriculture. Given this reality, the poor nation is highly vulnerable to the recent spike in international food prices (World Food Program, 2010). Second, the country is facing an increasingly dire lack of fresh water. Wells that used to only have to be dug 40 meters deep to reach aquifer now have to be dug to depths of nearly 1000 meters (Albert, 2009). Food and water insecurity are both linked to a national addiction to the chewable narcotic khat. Simply put, the Yemeni addiction to this drug is killing their nation and countrymen. Famine is at the doorstep because two thirds of Yemen’s arable land is devoted to khat production rather
than usable food products. Additionally, forty percent of the nation’s already scarce fresh water resources are used to irrigate this crop (Albert, 2009). In sum, Yemen is ceasing to exist as a state due to a number of self-inflicted wounds. It is exactly this level of poverty and weak government reach that has made the nation such an attractive haven for Al Qaeda.

In addition to Yemen’s crippling poverty, the nation has maintained strong ties to terrorist groups over the decades. Yemenis represented a significant portion of the foreign fighters recruited to Afghanistan during the 1980s. More recently, Yemeni citizens fighting with Al Qaeda have been captured in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Yemeni government’s relationship with fanatics is also unclear. For Butters et al (2009), “it’s common knowledge in the tearooms of Sana’a and in Western embassies that the government of Northern Yemen used jihadis to help defeat the south in the civilian war that ended in 1994” (p. 2). Butters et al (2009) also notes that after the events of 9/11/2001 and the United States led invasion of Iraq, the Saleh regime began to pressure elements of Al Qaeda in Yemen more aggressively. In a situation similar to that of Pakistan’s obsession with India, Yemen has traditionally been much more inclined to target the Shia population in the North and secessionists in the South rather than Al Qaeda.

With the background of Al Shabaab and AQAP in place, this paper will now turn to the objectives that each group pursues. It is best to look at Al Shabaab from two different angles. The first is the group’s role as a quasi-insurgency that uses terrorism to pursue political change and influence. As mentioned above, Shabaab’s domestic strategic goal is to gain control over Somalia and implement their brand of Islam across the land. To meet this domestic objective, the group battles the nascent Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in rather conventional street battles, and through the use of attacks on civilians. In August 2010 Al Shabaab executed a series of attacks in Mogadishu to further their domestic goals. Armed men attacked a local hotel and several bombs exploded near the TFG’s Parliament building (Wadhams, 2010).

Evans’ (2005) framework is useful for evaluating the August 2010 attacks in Mogadishu. On the first topic of publicity, these attacks certainly achieved their goal. While the “youth” are prominent in Southern Somalia, the skill with which the August attacks were carried out has garnered global attention. In terms of Evans’ (2005) second tenet of imposing a cost to one’s enemy is concerned, the August operation can also be seen as successful. The TFG is exceedingly weak, incidents like this one where six Parliamentarians were killed only reinforces the government’s feeble image. The third tactical goal of forcing an overreaction on the part of the government does not apply due to its own weakness. Fourth, the goal of polarization is an important one. Some argue that Al Shabaab’s influence is limited by the public’s animosity towards Shari’a Law. The majority of Somalis are of the moderate Sufi sect of Islam and many of their traditions are outlawed by the Salafists. While this argument is valid, the population also yearns for security. Having lived with wretched violence for over two decades, Somalis will support whoever can provide a safer environment. It is the reason that they supported the ICU during the 1990s. Security at the hands of Islamic fundamentalists is better than no security at all. Finally, Evans’ (2005) final goal of gaining material advantage is also diminished in Somalia. Aside from the pirate’s who collect a lucrative ransom, Somalia is exceedingly poor.

In sum, Al Shabaab’s domestic campaign of violence fits into Evans’ (2005) piece regarding tactical objectives. The terrorists seek power and influence through the use of violence directed towards the civilian population; much like other traditional insurgent/terrorist
organizations. It is the other side, the international face of Al Shabaab that should concern the United States much more.

Al Shabaab’s first venture into transnational terrorism took place in Lebanon in 2006. The “youth” sent over seven hundred members to aid Hizballah in its war with Israel. It is believed that only 80 members of that contingent returned to Mogadishu after the fighting was over (Calibresi, 2010). Others are said to have either been killed in combat or, more ominously, remained behind to receive advanced training from Hizballah. The outsourcing of militants is an important development, and one that certainly diverges from Evans’ (2005) tactical objectives. Since it was not directed against any domestic target, such as the TFG, the operation could hardly have been intended to publicize or polarize the Somali population. Rather, Al Shabaab’s expedition to Lebanon represents a troubling example of an up and coming organization trying to impress and earn the respect of the terror establishment. This is an important tactical goal of modern fanatical groups.

Along with its clear desire to be part of the transnational terror club, Al Shabaab has employed a new tactic which could have serious implications for the international community. The organization is actively trying to recruit Somali expatriates within the United States. Within the last two years several dozen Somali-Americans from communities in the Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota region abruptly traveled to Somalia to fight for Al Shabaab. The story received national attention when one of the men, Shirwa Ahmed, earned the dubious honor of being the first American citizen to carry out a suicide bombing in Somalia. Ahmed’s attack killed dozens of TFG members and civilians (Ephron et al, 2009). As the international community continues to make improvements to their document security programs, the threat of a committed Jihadist with a real United States passport is obvious. These men now represent a tactical goal of Al Shabaab. They are a weapon that the “youth” can wield if they choose to execute an attack in the United States. This phenomenon has important policy implications that will be addressed in the third part of this paper.

Another group on the cutting edge of religious fanaticism is AQAP. The group has been prolific in its violence over the past decade. Targets have included the Yemeni Government, the United States Military, and American citizens at home. Three of these attacks have been inspired by the American citizen and radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki and supported by AQAP.

Faisal Shahzad, the failed Times Square bomber, admitted to being inspired by Awlaki. While he received no material support from AQAP, and very little from the Pakistani Taliban, the attack was nearly successful. The desire to commit mass murder of others has always been prevalent in any civilization. Our prisons are full of murderers. The important element in this case is the inspiration. Led by Awlaki, AQAP’s effort to spread their ideology to citizens of the west is significant and troubling. The group publishes Inspire magazine, in English, to “specifically target twentysomething jihadists with European or American citizenship” (Ranstorp & Alami, 2011). The magazine often includes pieces written by Al Qaeda leaders who seek to lionize their supporters and highlight the plight of Muslims around the world. The cover is a well produced glossy product like any other newsstand offering. It draws the reader in to cover more important terror topics such as how-to articles regarding the construction of the best explosive laden vehicle (Alami, 2011). Awlaki has also proffered his message through the Internet. Taking full advantage of the era of globalization, the radical cleric has created hundreds of Youtube videos in which he preaches the Salafist’s manifesto. Under the cover of
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the West’s freedom of speech laws the videos remained posted for years until they were finally removed in 2010 (Burns et al, 2010). The magazine and Youtube videos are an important new tactic on the part of radicals like Awlaki. The ability to spread the message of Jihad into the United States, while remaining safely hidden in Yemen is a powerful new tool; one that almost succeeded in the case of Faisal Shahzad.

A year prior to Shahzad’s failed attempt to bomb Times Square, Anwar al-Awlaki was more successful in his inspiration. On November 5, 2009 Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan opened fire on fellow soldiers on Fort Hood, Texas. He killed 13 individuals and wounded 29 others before being shot by security forces. The significance of this case is the electronic communication between Hasan in Texas and Awlaki in Yemen. As early as a year before the attack Hasan was exchanging emails with the cleric regarding the nature of jihad and the lawfulness of suicide missions (Shone & El-Buri, 2009). He sought the spiritual support of Awlaki to carry out the attack and afterward, the cleric used Hasan’s act for publicity purposes. The correspondence was reported to be significant in number with as many as 18 emails exchanged between the two men (Shone & El-Buri, 2009). While no one can say for sure if Hasan would have carried out the attacks without Awlaki’s support, logic would indicate that as a member of the Army, the Major would have had ample access to soldiers and weapons in the past. The timing of the attacks, coming after extensive communication with the propagandist certainly cannot be overlooked.

Finally, AQAP has lashed out against the United States in slightly more conventional ways. The failed attempt to detonate a bomb in an aircraft on Christmas day 2009 is one example. A Nigerian man, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab tried to ignite a pouch of explosive hidden within his undergarment. When the plane landed safely in Detroit and Abdulmutallab was taken into custody his interrogation indicated that he had received training in Yemen. He was taught rudimentary bomb making and instructed to wait to detonate the aircraft until it was over a densely populated area. While the attack was a resounding failure in terms of downing the aircraft, AQAP’s message was still communicated. The organization demonstrated that despite a decade of the “War on Terrorism”, Americans are still vulnerable. Zakaria (2010) eloquently states that “his mission failed entirely, killing not a single person. The suicide bomber was not even able to commit suicide. But Al Qaeda succeeded in its real aim, which was to throw the American system into turmoil” (p. 1).

In sum, AQAP is operating at the cutting edge of terror tactics with Al Shabaab close behind. Al Qaeda’s Yemeni affiliate is able to attack when others have failed to do so. Complicated and expensive terror plots are even more difficult to pull off in today’s international environment. Adapting to this reality, AQAP has focused on smaller operations. The Fort Hood shooting, arguably AQAP’s most successful attack in the last few years, was inspired though the use of a keyboard alone. In a similar fashion, Al Shabaab is looking to recruit new jihadists who are citizens of the United States. A significant number of counter-terrorism measures can be defeated with the possession of a legal U.S. passport.

These two groups exhibit a change in the tactical goals of terror operations. The objectives of material gain, weakening the opponent, and polarizing societies are becoming less important. In their place comes the desire to inspire violence. The tactical goal of inciting smaller scale attacks, even if they don’t always succeed, is critical. Merely showing that you are still around despite the international community’s decade long onslaught is a type of small
victory. The focus on inspiring violence through the use of media and the recruitment of western citizens into the jihadist cause will require an adjustment to current counter-terrorism policy.

The cases of Shahzad, Hasan, and the men from Minneapolis fall into the category of self-radicalization. In a seminal piece, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) studied this phenomenon in depth. Their report indicated a four step process that resulted in an individual like Hasan or Shahzad that was prepared to act. The first step is Pre-Radicalization which primarily refers to the environment that the individual exists within. It also includes a rough psychological profile which suggests that middle aged Muslim men who are of middle class economic status and are likely second generation immigrants to the United States. It is a rough estimate because in Sageman’s (2004) words “There's really no profile, just similar trajectories to joining the jihad and that most of these men were upwardly and geographically mobile. They came from moderately religious, caring, middle-class families…” (p. 3).

The second stage is that of Self-Identification. This is the stage when external influences begin to move individuals to discover more about Salafist ideals. The report adds that individuals are likely to reach this stage after a life altering event; be it a divorce, loss of a family member, or in Shahzad’s case, the foreclosure of his family’s home. Simply put, this is an introductory exploration phase where the individual begins to ask questions about Islamic fanaticism.

Stage three is the indoctrination phase. It is the “stage in which an individual progressively intensifies his beliefs, wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi ideology and concludes…that action is required to support and further the Salafist cause” (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 36). At this point an individual has accepted that the Salafist world view is the correct one, and that violence against non-believers is justified.

The final stage is referred to as Jihadization. The individual has accepted their “duty to participate in Jihad” (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 43). The stage also includes the operational planning for an attack. The NYPD’s report also indicates that “group think” becomes an important factor at this stage. The Minnesota men who travelled to Somalia to fight for Al Shabaab knew each other, and certainly discussed the life changing decisions they were making.

In sum, the NYPD report provides a thoughtful framework with which to approach policymaking. Each step provides a pressure point for counter-terrorism professionals to target. Given the civil liberties enjoyed in the United States, the creation of specific policy towards a demographic group is difficult, thus making stage one more challenging to interdict. It goes without question that law enforcement cannot target every middle-aged Muslim man who was recently divorced. That being said, effective policies that encourage community policing in predominantly Muslim cities and neighborhoods is essential. In 2008 Attorney General Holder visited and publicly thanked the Somali Community for its assistance in dismantling some of the network established by Al Shabaab. He stated that the courageous step by twenty Somali families to cooperate with FBI engagement efforts led to important arrests (Leinwald & Dorell, 2010). These communities are close knit. The Minneapolis success came only after the concerted effort of Somali Americans and FBI agents.

Stage three also offers opportunities for intervention by counter-terrorism policies. The acceptance of the Salafist agenda does not happen without a little help. In the case of Shahzad
and Hasan, this help came from AQAP. Whether in the form of an internet video, a magazine, or email exchange; contact does occur between Jihadists and the individual contemplating an attack. Any sort of communication creates an opportunity for law enforcement and the intelligence community to intercept and analyze. A proper policy recommendation must be one that leverages the United States’ considerable ability to collect electronic communication between terrorists.

Stage four provides a final chance to stop a plot before it becomes a successful terror attack. At this late hour, the counter terrorism network must function flawlessly. Individuals like Adbdulmutallab cannot be allowed to purchase one way airline tickets carrying no checked baggage and completing the purchase in cash. Intelligence sharing and database management have to be hallmarks of successful policy.

Having provided policy recommendations to combat self radicalization, this paper will now turn to the proper response to Al Shabaab and AQAP. As the first part of this paper described, Somalia and Yemen represent two of the world’s most failed and failing nations. Terrorists have used these lawless expanses to their advantage by creating training camps and other command infrastructure. While in the long run a sweeping multilateral plan to rescue these two states and bring them back to a functional state is certainly preferred, it is not feasible today. To combat the threat of the Salafists in Somalia and Yemen the United States needs to continue its strikes against the enemy’s hard points. In a time when leaders like Awlaki can inspire violence through a keyboard stroke or an internet video alone, the United States needs to take advantage of terrorist infrastructure as it appears. The use of inspired violence and self radicalization may make terror “training camps” a thing of the past. In the meantime, terror infrastructure cannot be allowed to stand.

In conclusion, the changing landscape of terrorism’s tactical objectives will continue to present challenges for law enforcement and counterterrorism efforts. Two groups, Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have been discussed at length. Al Shabaab’s ability to recruit American citizens is troubling and represents a loaded weapon should the group choose to attack the United States. AQAP has demonstrated an exceptional ability to inspire individual acts of terrorism upon the West. It is only a matter of time until they can refine their message to a point where the tactics used become more complicated and successful. Both groups have exploited the relatively new phenomenon of self radicalization. This is a disturbing new trend that brings terrorism to our neighborhoods and places of worship. New strategies and approaches must be used by law enforcement. One that gains the trust of immigrant communities with the objective of stopping the process of radicalization before it results in an attack. Finally, terrorists in places like Somalia and Yemen need to be under constant threat of violence by the United States. All elements of the National Security structure must be leveraged to wage a small scale and covert campaign against Al Shabaab and AQAP leadership as they become available. Only a concerted effort involving community organizations, law enforcement, and the military will be successful in exploiting these new tactical terror objectives.
References


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