

Insurgency, Guerilla Warfare and Terrorism: Conflict and its Application for the Future

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Abstract

Current conflicts in the international arena are wars of insurgent action. As this action has proven necessary in the building of nations historically, the increased utilization of tactics to include guerilla war and terrorism has become commonplace. The proper identification of conditions, which promote violence, as well as exacerbate the utilization of promotion of political violence (terrorism) increases counterinsurgency and counterterrorism tools available for proper combat against such actions. Proper utilization of governmental reforms to include economic, social, and communicative, has the effects to minimize the need for insurgent action, allowing marginalized groups self-determination in a functioning state.

Key Words: Colonialism, Economic, Guerilla, Insurgency, Political, Propaganda, Reform, Revolution, Terrorism, Violence

Introduction

As a tool for dramatic change, insurgencies have become the building blocks of violent regime change or concession capitulation. Due to the permanence of their action, understanding insurgencies, combined with underlying guerilla tactics and the continual evolving movement of terrorist conflict, is paramount in determining international cooperation and response, thereby increasing their effectiveness in political discourse. Using violence as a means of political discourse, insurgent and guerilla action has utilized weaknesses in the state to increase their political demands, changing the shape of international discourse. Systemic failures in the areas of economic advancement, cultural and ethnic marginalization, inefficient political beaurocracy, and resource management encouraged leaders such as Mao Tse-tung and Ernesto “Che” Guevara to lead guerilla and insurgent actions utilizing a Marxist proletariat uprising against the state and the emplaced elitist ruling classes. Their actions led, and continue to lead, many groups to follow their example in insurgent actions coupled with the advancement (geographical, ideological, and technical) of terrorist activity to gain increased popular support and international attention to their plight. Through the understanding of insurgencies and the actions in which they take in the utilization of terrorism and guerilla warfare, international counterinsurgent policy needs to lead to intervention earlier in the cycle, increasing negotiative capabilities to reduce the propensity of violence.

While violence has been a prevalent condition in the international arena for millennia, the one needed structure in insurgency and its effects on nation building is the presence of a political

leadership acting (actual or perceived) for the populace. From early Roman control of conquered regions to the current opposition in Iraq and the escalating violence seen in Taliban controlled regions of Afghanistan, the common denominator of an insurgency is the emplacement of a government. It is important to note the historical existence of insurgent activities throughout human conflict and governmental control of the populace (achieved or attempted). The reorganizing of the state structure, commencing with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, increased the actual propensity and political profitability of insurgency, giving repressed groups a platform in which to air grievances, and the necessary focus in which to aim their violence in an effort to politicize their agendas. While this has evolved in the modern realm, especially the current Pashtu/Taliban actions against NATO forces in Afghanistan and in the tribal controlled areas of Pakistan, the base for insurgency is increased power or representation from the masses, utilizing violence as a tool for either regime defeat or capitulation of a wide range and scope of demands.

Nature of Insurgency

Insurgencies have been essential in nation building activities since the earliest histories. Bard O'Neill explains, "insurgency has probably been the most prevalent type of armed conflict since the creation of organized political communities" (O'Neill, 2005: 1). O'Neill thus defines insurgency (or internal war) as: "a general overarching concept that refers to a conflict between a government and an out group or opponent in which the latter uses both political resources and violence to change, reformulate, or uphold the legitimacy of one or more of four key aspects of politics" (O'Neill, 2002, as cited in Taber, 2002: viii). These aspects of politics are, "(1) the integrity of the borders and composition of the nation state, (2) the political system, (3), the authorities in power, and (4) the policies that determine who gets what in societies" (O'Neill, 2002, as cited in Taber, 2002: viii). Indeed, the increase of insurgent activity relies on a state political structure enabled to control the economic, political, and social freedoms of the masses. Due to this view, insurgent activity is a form of "movement - a political effort with a specific aim," (Terrorism Research, 2009). The political aim of insurgencies thrives in situations where "societal divisions were cumulative and were combined with economic and political disparities" (O'Neill, 2005: 4). The identification of exoteric appeals, more specifically political and economic disparages, is crucial in understanding social unrest leading to insurgent actions. Rising unemployment and underemployment, unequal distribution of wealth, inadequate distribution of essential goods, elitist control of the political structure, and corrupt leadership all are highly involved factors leading to popular dissatisfaction, opening the door to insurgent action and guerilla warfare. In examining the effect of exoteric appeals on both the "intelligentsia and the masses," leading to "unemployment or underemployment can lead not only to inadequate supply of material necessities, but also to psychological dissatisfaction" (O'Neill, 2005: 101). "The masses," argues Gabriel Almond (1966), "are only capable of registering their grievances; they cannot grasp the shape and form of the historical process in which those grievances are merely incidents" (as cited in O'Neill, 2005: 101). This in turn allows for manipulation and extensive exploitation to incite popular support by various movements, such as the earlier Communist or Marxist-Leninist indoctrination in many regions towards the ills of the American/Western capitalistic societies, setting the stage for possible insurgent action against political leadership of the state.

Modern insurgencies have evolved from early political failures. While the presence of popular insurrections has been in movement since early political form, their ability to achieve desired results has been minimal. According to Robert Taber, insurgencies have "failed, or in any case have produced only limited victories, because the techniques they can exploit today were then irrelevant to the historical situation" (Taber, 2002: 13). In essence, according to Taber,

“until now, the popular majorities, the laboring, unspecialized masses of pre-industrial societies, were able to exert very little political or economic leverage” (Taber, 2002: 13). The diminished existence of the middle ages, compared to modern populations, arose from not only the inability of the affected majority to gain weaponry, but from their ability to influence the economic or political conditions in which they labored. “Economically, they were manageable because they lived too close to the level of bare subsistence to be otherwise” (Taber, 2002: 14). In effect, this negated proletariat movement in affecting the system as a whole as their removal from the structure did little to change the effects of their labor, and their ability to diminish their labors were directly responsible for exacerbating their meager existence. Taber explains, “If they starved, or rebelled and were slaughtered, *there was no one to care*, no economically or politically potent class to whom it would make the slightest difference” (italics added) (Taber, 2002: 14). In the end, to rebel was a direct action against themselves, with the loss of life being of no consequence to political elitism, or economic centrality. Successful insurgent action came not from the proletariat, but from the bourgeois class as internal elitist struggles forced the change of regime in favor of the victors. The rapid expansion of colonialism and the race for world economic and territorial superiority by Western Europe enacted a ripple effect of insurgent actions, setting the stage for violent exchange as seen in many areas of the world today.

Colonialism brought Western order to the so-called newly discovered world as the discovery of the fallacy of a flat earth furthered the reach of existing governments. The need to increase economic holdings through political and military seizure expanded the rule of Western law to distant shores, bringing with it many of the aspects needed for insurgencies to exist in the modern era. While this is true, it is worth noting the existence of civilizations in the pre-terra nullius period in which insurgencies and revolts did exist. Insurgent and revolutionist actions in pre-Columbian history can explain the loss of Mesoamerican civilizations. Mogul invasions destroyed whole regions where aggression existed against their rule. Roman destruction of Jerusalem grew from the inability to control Zealots and their attempts to rid a growing secular intrusion of their centuries old homogenous religious structure, scattering the Jewish populations throughout the Roman Empire. While some of these actions still affect the modern world, it was the introduction of colonialism and the effects of imposed political adherence, which enabled one of the most important cornerstones of insurgency, leading to revolution and, for some, eventual statehood. This new episode of nationalism, where none previously existed, led to the increase of political dissatisfaction against imperialistic exploitation of indigenous populations. O’Neill explains nationalism as having “a particular potent appeal in many insurgencies. Whether or not nationalist ideals are part of a larger comprehensive ideological thought system, they continue to play a part in galvanizing popular support for many insurgent movements” (O’Neill, 2005: 170). This is as true in examining insurgent groups as divergent as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) to the Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA) to modern Taliban and African violent organizations, nationalistic designs are inherent in the political struggle on a global level, with most such actions originating from previous colonial states.

Many postcolonial insurgencies have demanded the right to the self-determination free from foreign intervention, especially from what is often viewed as puppet regimes, or regimes set up and funded by colonial powers, acting as a tool for continued foreign benefit. The inception of the Jewish nationalistic homeland in Israel, moderate Islamic states, postcolonial India, and many Asian, African, and Latin American states have all fallen under this guise, each with repercussions leading to insurgent actions, resulting in statehood for some, and ethnic and religious violence for others. The greatest example of colonial action and the utilization of insurgency are the North American continent and the Revolutionary War. Political and militaristic protest by American settlers against unfair taxation and political repression, among many other underlying reasoning, of the colonies started the modern era of insurgencies leading

to revolution and the current world structure. By revolting against the repressive regimes of the British monarchies, insurgent action led to harsh repercussions against the colonists, leading to the Declaration of Independence and the Revolutionary War. From this, the first truly successful insurgency by both the bourgeois and proletariat, the act of nation building through insurgency became the starting point for revolutionary action quickly followed by the French Revolution (although with different end results). In conjunction to insurgent escalation during the Revolutionary War time period came the tools of insurgency: guerilla warfare and terrorism.

Guerilla Warfare and Terrorism

The middle of the 18th century and the increase of violence between powers brought with it a new form of small force fighting, what the French termed “*la petite guerre*” which later became the Spanish “*guerilla*” (Polk, 2008: 3). Due to the rising lethality of weaponry, and the utilization of formation warfare, the need for external forces to harass opposition forces evolved the guerilla fighter. While detested “as not a form of war, but rather a manifestation of criminality,” the usefulness of guerilla warfare proved fruitful in fighting and turning the tide in many battles (Polk, 2008: 3). According to Colonel Henry Bouquet, (1763), guerilla forces (in this case Native American warriors) “never congregate in a group that could be destroyed by the superior firepower of the regular troops and when attacked they never stand their ground, but immediately give way only to return to the charge when the attack ceases” (as cited in Polk, 2008: 2). They fought in the manner of guerillas, “loosely adapting to terrain, quick to attack and quicker to retreat, hanging on the edge of superior forces to pick off stragglers and to disrupt, loot, or destroy the cumbersome supply wagons that accompanied every British force” (Polk, 2008: 2-3). In fighting against the British elite, these small forces, comprising local militia usually with little to no funding or military training, took on the form of guerilla warfare, which was defined half a century later by the Spanish as they fought Napoleon’s forces (Polk, 2008: 11). The leadership of the era “were for a time independent chiefs, receiving neither pay, subsistence, arms, nor stores from government, but fed and clothed by the contributions of friends and the spoils of the enemies, armed with such weapons as could be found or made in the country” (Amos Kendall, 1863, as cited in Polk, 2008: 11). Due to the tactical success of violent opposition and the effects of political change, guerilla warfare became the modus operandi of inception revolution against repressive regimes by leaders such as Mao Tse-tung and Ernesto “Che” Guevara. In effect, this changed the status quo of political elitism, and influenced new generations of insurgencies utilizing guerilla warfare as a modus operandi.

Mao Tse-tung (1936) set the stage for modern guerilla action and the need for conditions to exist in which to carry out violent attacks against advanced militaries. According to Mao:

...during the stage of retreat we should in general secure at least two of the following conditions before we can consider the situation as being favorable to us and unfavorable to the enemy and before we can go over to the counter offensive.

These conditions are:

- (1) The population actively supports the Red Army.
- (2) The Terrain is favorable for operations.
- (3) All the main forces of the Red Army are concentrated.
- (4) The enemy’s weak spots have been discovered.
- (5) The enemy has been reduced to a tired and demoralized state.
- (6) The enemy has been induced to make mistakes. (Mao, 1936: 55)

These conditions are imperative for successful guerilla operations. While Mao focused his movement on change in the Chinese empire, the correlation with his demands in the inception of guerilla and insurgent activity enabled new movements on a global scale against regimes which were perceived as repressive (real or perceived). Hence, we see the correlation between Mao and Ernesto “Che” Guevara in the need for imperative conditions to be present. Guevara reiterated Mao’s tactical goals in insurgent and guerilla action as the fighter needs “a good knowledge of the countryside, the paths of entry and escape, the possibilities of speedy maneuver, good hiding places; naturally also, he must count on the support of the people” (Guevara, 2007: 9). Accordingly, it is imperative the population identifies with the movement by observing and understanding the “futility of maintaining the fight for social goals within the framework of civil debate (Guevara, 2007: 8). By reaffirming the inherent need of popular support, this aspect of guerilla warfare is viewed as indispensable in successful insurgent action.

The use of violence is not necessarily “to draw attention to, or generate publicity for, a cause, but also to inform, educate, and ultimately rally the masses behind the revolution” (Hoffman, 2006: 5). Under this idea, guerilla warfare, as a tactic to insurgent action, is a tool to rally the masses behind the force itself. Giuseppe Mazzini (1864) argued, “Guerilla bands are the precursors of the nation, and endeavor to rouse the nation to insurrection,” leading it to be a valuable asset to insurgency and ultimately, revolution (Mazzini, 1864, *Rules for the Conduct of Guerilla Bands*, in Laqueur, 2005: 268). Guerilla warfare has a minimized ability to act as an individual function of violent opposition compared to the modern insurgency, but as such, its usefulness in opposition to main armies sets it apart as a people’s army, employing it as a means of gaining necessary concessions and supplies from the state itself. It is a conscious initiatory condition of insurgent warfare. While insurgencies themselves do not inherently utilize guerilla warfare and terrorist tactics, the strategic inclusion of such has the purpose of demoralizing opposition forces in an attempt to gain political advances as well as to polarize popular support for the movement.

The expectation of an insurgent action is not the quick capitulation or expected surrender of governmental militaries, but the protracted war. According to Taber, “The conflict must continue until the movement has recruited and trained enough men, and come into possession of enough arms, to build a revolutionary army capable of defeating the regular army in open battle” (Taber, 2002: 40). “Failing this,” insurgency and the utilization of terrorism and guerilla warfare must “continue until political developments resulting from the campaign have brought about the desired end: the rising of the masses of the people and the overthrow or abdication of the discredited government” (Taber, 2002: 40). Insurgencies themselves lie within two extremes. On the one end is the *coupe d’état* as seen in the Cuban revolution and the expulsion of Batista, on the other end is the long drawn out action in which no ending or capitulation is calculated. While the hope of a *coupe d’état* and a quick ending to an insurgency is hopeful, most actions themselves lie between the extremes, necessitating popular support to secure the continuation of the action. Terrorism and guerilla action has become commonplace in insurgent activity throughout the modern duration of warfare. According to The U.S. Army, Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manuel, the combatant inherently “prefers a quick, cheap, overwhelming victory over a long, bloody, protracted struggle” (The U.S. Army, Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manuel, 2007: 3). As insurgent violence has not achieved the level of revolutionary, the availability of weapons to secure territory and repel state armies in open combat is minimal, forcing the focus onto nonconventional weapons and tactics. As always, popular support is crucial to the movement, conditioning insurgent and guerilla action to propagandize their victories and state weaknesses to the people themselves.

Another powerful tool in the insurgent portfolio is then terrorism and its ability to highlight the inability of the state to protect both themselves and constituent populations. In addition,

terrorism has been a tool to remove factors affecting the message of the movement itself. According to Guevara, “Terrorism should be considered a valuable tactic when it is used to put to death some noted leader of the oppressing forces well known for his cruelty, his efficiency in repression, or other quality that makes his elimination useful” (Guevara, 2007: 17-18). In communities where state forces make insurgent activity impossible, the use of terrorism may be necessary to “circumspect in adopting methods of this type and to consider the consequences that they may bring for the revolution” (Guevara, 2007: 18). By identifying the psychological aspects and objectives of the populace, insurgent organizations can diminish government or state support by utilizing terrorism to assassinating key figures or destroying vital facilities, highlighting both their power, and the inability of security by the state itself. The politicization and promotion of such actions leaves the insurgency with the upper hand due to their position in the population itself, bringing home their actions and abilities at the ground level. In rallying the masses, the utilization of propaganda to spread the messages and bravado of insurgent groups has become an indispensable advancement in modern terrorism. This leads to conflict with the international community as the increase in technology and the on-demand condition of news media makes the condition of propaganda by deed an indispensable tactic for the expansion of terrorism.

The question, inherently, is when does an insurgency decide the use of terrorism outweighs the state and international response? In following up this with another question, what constitutes the designation of an insurgency as a terrorist organization, and who ultimately makes the determination in the international arena? These two questions work in conjunction with each other, leaving a vacuum in the actual definition of terrorism, and the regional acceptance of actions defining its designation. The use of various acts by guerilla forces such as rape, murder, and plunder are common actions inherent in the nature of the insurgency, the use of the same act to transmit a political message “(such as discouraging collaboration or prompting ethnic cleansing) would be terrorism as well as part of a guerilla war” (Byman, 2005: 25). According to Hafiz al-Asad, former president of Syria, “a terrorist is a mercenary who is motivated by the desire to kill, while those who struggle are freedom fighters who have a cause, in defense of which they exert all their spiritual and material efforts” (Al-Asad, Brandlee, Hogland, Randall, & Kerbitte, 1986: 6). This Arab reality of terrorism and its ability to act under the guise of “freedom fighter” negates regional responsibility of terrorist acts, which are aimed at colonial, and interventionist forces. Sheik Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah (1991) explains, “We don’t see ourselves as terrorists, because we do not believe in terrorism. We don’t see resisting the occupier as a terrorist action. We see ourselves as mujihadeen who fight a Holy War for the people” (as cited in Hoffman, 2006: 23). The utilization of the term terrorist is then a “moral judgment; and if one party can successfully attach the label terrorist to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint” (Jenkins, B. as cited in Hoffman, 2006: 23). It is this point that differentiates the occidentalist and orientalist definition of terrorism, allowing for the regional utilization of terrorist tactics as a viable part of guerilla and insurgent action.

As terrorism itself is a method in which to evoke a propagandized effect, the utilization of such by many groups follows the increased interventionist stances of the West and its allies. The utilization of international humanitarian intervention action by insurgent groups has increased terrorism as a tool for increased propaganda and the formation of international public opinion. This new tool, working in conjunction with the modern communicative media, has fostered a new medium in which to utilize terrorism. According to Alan J. Kuperman (2009), “in some cases, substate actors may be driven by the expectation that humanitarian intervention can enable them to prevail at a cost in state retaliation that they deem acceptable” (Kuperman, A., 2009: 54). The utilization of insurgency and terrorism against majority groups as a means to garner international intervention has proven a useful tool for many groups. Attacks by the former LTTE

on Sri Lankan forces and civilians prompted quick retaliation against the Tamil population, enticing an Indian intervention using troops with diasporas supplying financial and sanctuary assistance. While the intervention of troops failed, the subsequent treaty between Sri Lanka and India had disastrous effects on the former's economy and governmental popular support while the use of troops caused a backlash from the Tamil Nadu region of India, forcing an about face of the Indian troops against the LTTE leadership and people (Pfaffenberger, 1988: 144). The propaganda affect and subsequent disapproval of the Sri Lankan government increased support for the LTTE and their cause, which enabled them to further operations.

The same is evident in current HAMAS operations from the Gaza strip in southern Palestine. Terrorist actions against the Israeli regime forced the Israeli armies into Palestinian territories to remove opposition strongholds and leadership, utilizing the media to highlight the Palestinian plight for influencing the international media. Norton Mezvinsky (2003) explains:

- 1) The Israeli government sent the Israeli army into West Bank towns and villages only to destroy the terrorist infrastructure. 2) In this war against terrorism some civilians, most of them shielding terrorists, were unfortunately killed. The Israeli rationale failed to convince many astute outside observers, including reporters, United Nations officials, human rights activists and Red Cross personnel" (Mezvinsky, 2003: 199-200).

International humanitarian intervention has been a viable tool for Palestinian opposition and terrorist organizations. The utilization of the Al-Haami Apparatus of HAMAS is specially designed to monitor international opinion and to "gauge what effects mass demonstrations and suicide bombings have on Arab and world public opinion" (Aboul-Enein, 2003: 65). Following this example, many terrorist organizations have been able to provoke international condemnation against the host state through the utilization of attacks to provoke a disproportionate response. In accordance to Muslim actions against Serbian forces, HAMAS has attempted to "engage in violence sufficient to attract sympathetic Western intervention" (Kuperman, 2009: 53). This tactic has proven highly successful until their violation of the Israeli-HAMAS ceasefire in December 2008-January 2009 in which their attacks against Israel forced the invasion of Gaza and the condemnation by the international community of terrorists' missile strikes against Israeli civilian populations (Mowbray, 2009). While terrorist actions have been a recent detriment to Hamas actions, the usefulness of propaganda by deed has increased international awareness of violence and its effects. While not specifically terror related, the current movement of supplies into the HAMAS controlled regions of Palestine by various international organizations has exacerbated opposition against Israel's current blockade due to increased international focus in large part to the global media, forcing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to change Israel's three-year stance on banned items into the territory (Nasr, 2010). This new stance, due to increased international outrage about the deaths occurred during the boarding of a ship moving to run the current blockade, is a prime example of the utilization of the media to further the message and/or actions (positively or negatively) of organizations identified as terrorist by many of the world's governments.

In the end, the use of terrorism as a tool of an insurgent action is one of propaganda. From the humanitarian intervention of Western states into Serbia, to the spread of extremist ideology and anti-Zionism, terrorism's effectiveness in rallying the masses has proven successful. In paraphrasing Carlos Pisacane, Hoffman reiterated that the utilization of violence as a means of educating and informing the masses, "The didactic purpose of violence ... could never be effectively replaced by pamphlets, wall posters, or assemblies" (Hoffman, 2006: 5). The "oxygen of publicity" on which terrorists operate then is the force given them through the utilization of

violence itself (Hoffman, 2006: 184). Benjamin Netanyahu, former Israeli Prime Minister maintained, “unreported, terrorist acts would be like the proverbial tree falling in the silent forest” (Hoffman, 2006: 184). While such terrorist acts have not increased the propensity of the international community towards identification of their cause, it has been effective in lending new life to old or irrelevant struggles. As a tactic for insurgencies, the propagation itself highlights the repressive acts of the state against the populace, with the utilization of violence as the means to gain a platform in which to air their grievances. Such action has not always been fruitful, especially as violence in states with little Western interest has increased violence and genocide, as seen in the Sudan and Somalia, both of which escaped increased humanitarian interventionism in the face of disproportionate violence against insurgent groups and their supporters.

Insurgency, Guerilla Warfare, Terrorism, and International Policy

In looking at the implications of insurgency and their utilization of both guerilla and terrorist acts, Robert Taber examines at the historical context of postcolonial violence. Taber reports, “During the two decades since World War II, no colonial war has been lost by a colonial people, once entered into” (Taber, 2002: 57). Jewish and Arab violence forced the British mandate to be decided by the United Nations as India gained Independence from Britain. More recently, the Soviet Block in Europe effectively wrested independence from both the Soviet Union following the Cold War, and ultimately further segregated their nationalistic aims into smaller states. Afghanistan, Chechnya, Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine all achieved independence from Soviet control and/or aggression. South American and Africa have followed suit by their often-violent overthrow of European domination, and regional conflicts in the newly post-colonialist environment. Under the changing nature of insurgent actions and the success earned by post-colonial violence, the successful example by states to gain concessions commands the international community to evaluate the efficacy of their counterinsurgency policy.

There are many aspects of counterinsurgency to be undertaken by the international community. According to O’Neill, “Two factors that can have a major impact on the choice of strategy are the environment and government response” (O’Neill, 2005: 64). In looking at the effects of the government, a centralized leadership with the ability to effect changes is paramount in minimizing or dispelling insurgent violence. Many of the grievances aired by insurgent and guerilla organizations revolve around the inability of the political regime to conduct business in a manner exempt from elitist domination. As observed in Sri Lanka, the marginalization of minority groups further exacerbated decades of violence. Inclusionary tactics for minority groups with fair elections and regional accountability places the start of self-determination in the hands of those who ultimately decide their own fate: the movement towards violence or towards the contribution in the political process of the state. Increased economic capabilities, to include resource management by indigenous and minority groups instead of complete control of such by international corporations are an additional measure to defeat the undertone of an insurgency. By increasing regional utilization and production of viable resources, unemployment reduces, giving the masses both a sense of control of their own destinies, and increases the distribution of wealth, has the effect of reducing strife and discontent. As many leadership participants of an insurgency have an educational background, increase in employment and industrial capabilities of the state or region reduces both unemployment and underemployment, allowing for the insurgent itself to utilize expertise. This in turn effectively removes contributing members of the society from violent organizations as their gain can be seen of as a higher value than the repressed condition of an insurgent. O’Neill maintains that, “Successful government campaigns to cope with

terrorism and guerilla warfare and to undermine insurgent efforts to obtain, maintain, or increase popular support are closely associated both with a program to address the needs of the people and with administrative competence and capability” (O’Neill, 2005: 177). Through proper management of social services and welfare programs, the needs of insurgent masses can be met. Only by willingness of cooperation by the state and insurgent forces can a unified agreement be reached, considering that is the goal of the organizations.

In addition to political and economic concessions, the topic of land reforms need to be addressed, giving the population themselves a stake in the future of the state through ownership and rights associated with the use and proceeds garnered by such ownership. Once accomplished, many of the grievances of the people can be addressed, for without giving them a way out of their current poverty or economic condition, political concessions can be costly. O’Neill addresses this, as “programs without good administrators are hollow. Efficient administrators without programs are powerless, and those with bad programs may exacerbate whatever problems already exist” (O’Neill, 2005: 177). Understanding the political and economic conditions existing in pre-insurgent actions is crucial in countering insurgent activities, as insurgencies themselves are not an instantaneous movement, but relies on secrecy and conditional propaganda for a base of popular support before an initial confrontation is achievable. By organizing intelligence and viewing conditions that have the propensity to cause insurgent and guerilla action, the successful state can employ effective power to stall or defeat the condition leading to the uncertainty and discontent. While not all insurgencies can be avoided, proper use of resources decreases their likelihood.

Utilization of international organizations to combat insurgencies lends an additional dimension in counterinsurgency policy. Military, economic, and political actions by Western coalitions have the ability to fight against insurgent strategies, but their presence often increase the condition and propaganda for increased resistance. United States participation in South America is blamed on the increase of many of the nationalistic conflicts over the last several decades (as described by Guevara of the 60’s, in regards to Cuba, and the 1980’s Communist Party of Peru (The Shining Path)), as does current operations in the Middle East (Guevara, 2007: 97; Central Committee of the Communist Party of Peru, 1985: 8-9). Through increased regional cooperative agreements, states like the United States can reduce their military activities in Third World states while still assisting groups like ASEAN, Mercosur, the Arab League, and the Organization of African Unity in implementing and acting upon cultural and ideological change pertinent to their region and field of expertise. It is important to understand the presence of violence in today’s modern world, especially the War on Terrorism as declared following the 9/11 bombing, and its effect on the American political and military regime in bringing those responsible to justice and the ongoing Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The expansion the US’s reach in many states and regions in military conflict as well as political and economic cooperation supersede the utilization of many international organizations (IO). As the threat against the US and its allies diminishes, the movements of control of regional threats and concerns have the potential to be managed by the appropriate IO. Through proper assistance, where needed, the United States can reduce its presence in many states while giving regions a greater action in shaping the future of their constituents, eliminating the calls of imperialism and anti-American rhetoric. While the possibility of realist power is always present in counterinsurgency, encouraging regional regimes to act as a condition of aid or assistance is viable in increasing their position in the international arena, while reducing violence against Western targets as well as important infrastructure and foreign corporations.

The ability for insurgent leaders to voice claims of imperialistic actions, given the U.S.’s record of intervention in the Third World exacerbates the situation, decreasing the effectiveness of counterinsurgent policy. Actions like Viet Nam, where atrocities committed by United States

military personnel gave increased political voice to the opposition, further anti-American rhetoric. Conduct of foreign troops in Iraq in situations like the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib, the Haditha killings, and an increase of collateral damage through the accidental deaths of civilians degrades conditions, proving favorable to insurgent leadership. According to Sarah Sewell (2007), United States Forces needs “to make securing the civilian, rather than destroying the enemy, their top priority. The civilian population is the center of gravity – the deciding factor in the struggle” (The U.S. Army, Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007: xxv). The population now wants to know who will hurt them more. In the end, “civilians must be separated from insurgents to insulate them from insurgent pressure and to deny the insurgent ‘fish’ the cover of the civilian ‘sea,’” allowing the military to weaken popular support, starving the movement (Sewell, 2007, in The U.S. Army, Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007: xxv). As unintended casualties increase, the deaths of civilians “create an extended family of enemies – new insurgent recruits or informants – and erode support for the host nation,” ultimately undermining their progress in gaining popular support and secure lasting changes (Sewell, 2007, in The U.S. Army, Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007: xxv). The inability to protect civilians from both insurgent forces and friendly fire decreases popular support for the state. While this may not increase support for the insurgent/guerilla action, the decrease of state support leaves a neutral constituency whose usefulness in gaining information or repelling oppositional propaganda is vital.

The final and most important tactic in the counterinsurgency strategy is the effective use of propaganda to counter insurgent hold on the population. The use of terrorism in insurgent actions, as detailed earlier, is poised on their ability to influence public opinion towards their cause, or at least reduce the activity of the population to one of neutrality. By utilizing various means of propaganda, counterinsurgent strategies can effectively combat the message being fed to populations or regions apathetic to the revolutionary cause. Again, while the effect may not be full capitulation towards the state itself, it may nullify their propensity to side with the revolutionary segments of the population, as long as the use of propaganda is coupled with political and economic reforms. While the inherent constitutional freedoms of the press has grown in many states, calls of censorship have the ability to help the terrorist cause as states are reluctant to further engender the population against them. Responsible reporting and journalism is a first step in changing perceptions of terrorists. Utilizing what Brigitte Nacos (2007) calls “mass-mediated terrorism,” terrorist and international media organizations have developed a symbiotic relationship where each feeds off the other for ratings and propaganda effects (Nacos, 2007: 13). According to Nacos, “no other medium has provided more oxygen to terrorism than television because of its ability to report the news instantly, nonstop, and in visuals and words from any place to all parts of the globe” (Nacos, 2007: 47). The use of the media has become a two edged sword in counterterrorist and insurgency policy. The availability of programming towards insurgent messages is also a viable medium for counterinsurgency propaganda. By highlighting transparent leadership and governance of the state, the usefulness of the media can increase education, information, and opportunities for affected populations not available a decade earlier, combating opposition messages. Additionally, as propaganda of deed has become a prime strategy of insurgent terrorism, the ability to affect the dissemination of events to suspect or susceptible populations lays with responsible reporting. According to Nacos, “those who respond to a terrorist event have the opportunity to manage information and influence the public in what they believe is the best solution for resolving an emergency situation of this kind and/or dealing with the aftermath of such an incident” (Nacos, 2007: 195). Through the removal of the incident from the view of the public, or decreasing attention gained from violent acts, acting like Netanyahu’s “proverbial tree.” As the utilization of mass media was cemented by the 1972 Munich Olympics kidnapping of Israeli athletes, the hold of terrorist organizations over the

dissemination of terrorist messages or propaganda by deed has held the international audience hostage by proxy since. Once we can remove this “oxygen of publicity,” we can increase other aspects of counterinsurgency and the gaining of popular support. The one main caveat of utilizing aspects of promotion of terrorism actions in the press and the repression or selection of reporting on such actions will inherently be the contestation of such through the courts as being unconstitutional in the US political structure. There will be no easy fix for such contestation and the effects of increased coverage of terrorist violence and carnage in the modern media and the at-will media agencies, which broadcast continually on a global basis. This aspect of the propaganda by deed utilized by terrorist organizations may be the thorn in counterterrorism as the need to report on violence to the masses bolsters the very act and definition of terrorism.

Conclusion

In the modern action of nation building, insurgencies, and the use of guerilla and terrorist tactics, have been beneficial in reshaping the political and state structure of the globe since the onset of political governance. While many regions of the globe have benefitted from this action, and most still do, tools available to the insurgent have become a bane to the international community. Acts of terrorism, while increasing the propaganda effect of insurgencies and eliciting increased popular support, have placed many insurgent groups at odds with the rest of the globe, endangering the lives of millions of people and international security. While not all insurgencies utilize guerilla warfare and terrorism, those that have employed their benefits have been increasingly targeted by counterterrorism and counterinsurgency actions by the United States and its allies, setting the stage for violent action in the Middle East, Asia, South and Latin America, and parts of Europe. Through carefully evaluating the conditions that makes insurgent use of terrorism successful, the international community has the ability to increase the scope and effectiveness of their operations, thereby decreasing or nullifying the inherent popularity of such organizations. Political and economic advancements, reductions in unemployment and underemployment, land reforms, transparent governance, and inclusionary conditions for minority political participation have been successful in targeting the conditions that lead to insurgencies and its use of both guerilla warfare and terrorism. By paying increased attention to the utilization of propaganda, or the lack of utilization in some instances, counterinsurgent forces can steer insurgent and terrorist factions away from increased violence, highlighting many of the benefits and reforms of the state that directly addresses their grievances and conditions of exclusion or marginalization.

As a majority of insurgent, guerilla and terrorist organizations rely on increased popular support, focusing on techniques to decrease this support and negate it or increase state support is crucial for a quick and effective counterinsurgent policy. Through responsible journalistic practices in the modern media, popular support of violent factions can and have been minimized, with the possibility of nullifying the propagandized effects of terrorist groups towards societal inclusion and acceptance. While the ideation of the end of insurgency is a romantic thought, not all insurgencies can be stopped; through due diligence and utilization of effective counterinsurgency tools, the effects of such on the international community and the damage inflicted on states and their populations can be minimized.

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